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One purpose of fines and damage awards is to deter harmful 
behavior. When enforcement is imperfect, however, so the 
probability that any given violation will be punished is less than 
100%, the law's deterrent effect is usually thought to be reduced. 
Thus, it is often said that the ideal penalty (insofar as deterrence is 
concerned) equals the harm caused by the violation multiplied by 
one over the probability of punishment. For example, if a violation 
faces only a 25% (or one-in-four) chance of being punished, on this 
view the optimal penalty would be four times the harm caused by 
the violation. 
This prescription, which I will call the "multiplier principle," has 
a long pedigree.1 It figures prominently in texts on law and 
economics,2 and has been discussed in many scholarly works.3 
Indeed, in the law review literature the multiplier principle is now 
routinely cited as part of standard deterrence theory.4 The 
1. In modem economics, the multiplier principle owes much of its prominence to Gary S. 
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169 (1968). An 
early version of the multiplier principle can be found in CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND 
PuNISHMENTS 46 (David Young ed., 1986) (1766), and more explicitly in JEREMY BENTHAM, 
A THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (R. Hildreth trans., London, Triibner & Co. 1864) (1802). 
For a further discussion of these historical roots, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and 
the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 425-27 (1998). 
2. See, e.g., ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 390-95 (1988); A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-78 (2d ed. 1989); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.1, at 241 (5th ed. 1998). 
3. The most recent and most comprehensive of these is A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998). Earlier 
analyses, in addition to the textbooks cited supra note 2, include WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160 (1987); Bruce 
Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 
ALA. L. REv. 741, 808-19 (1989); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When 
and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1143, 1149·61 (1989); and Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1982). 
4. Examples published in just the last two years include Tom Baker, Reconsidering 
Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 101, 106-07; Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. 
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damage Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 1585, 1619-20 (1998); David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What 
Information Should Jurors Be Given to Determine the Amount of a Punitive-Damage Award?, 
57 Mo. L. REv. 174, 187 nn.82-83 {1998); Antony W. Dnes & Jonathan S. Seaton, An 
Exploration of the Tort-Criminal Boundary Using Manslaughter and Negligence Cases, 17 
INTI- REv. L. & EcoN. 537, 539 (1997); C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust 
Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5 
(1997); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 & nn.115-16 (1998); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and 
Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REv. 837 app. at 934 (1997); 
Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, 
5 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 179, 186 (1997); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and 
Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law 
of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 81-86 (1997); Cass R. 
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 
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multiplier principle has also begun to be recognized by courts -
especially by economically sophisticated judges - as a possible 
rationale for punitive damages.s 
What is less widely appreciated, however, is that the multiplier 
principle is almost never necessary to achieving optimal deterrence. 
Even when the probability of punishment is less than 100%, more 
recent work in law and economics has identified several other 
remedies that could also achieve optimal deterrence.6 These 
alternative remedies are often significantly less than those called for 
by the multiplier principle. In some cases, the alternative remedies 
could even be less than the harm caused by the violation, implying 
that optimal deterrence could be achieved if damages were 
reduced. 
My principal aims in this article are to explain why the 
multiplier principle is not necessary for optimal deterrence and to 
begin a discussion of the alternatives. While the mathematical 
analysis behind the recent work is often quite technical, the basic 
principles are not hard to grasp, and they can be illustrated with 
simple numerical examples. Thus, a secondary aim is to familiarize 
a larger audience with the conclusions of this technical body of 
work. Since this work identifies alternatives to the multiplier 
principle, its significance is potentially as broad as that of the 
multiplier principle itself. 
Part I begins by reviewing how optimal deterrence is achieved 
by what I will call the "traditional multiplier principle," in which the 
harm caused by a defendant's offense is multiplied by one over the 
probability of punishment. When the probability of punishment is 
the same no matter how badly a defendant has behaved, such a 
multiplier is relatively easy to administer. In most contexts in which 
enforcement is imperfect, however, the probability of punishment 
any particular defendant faces depends in part on the nature of his 
or her violation. That is, in most legal regimes, defendants who 
commit only marginal offenses are less likely to be punished than 
those who commit more serious or egregious ones. Whenever this 
is the case, Part I shows that the traditional multiplier principle can 
107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2082-84 (1998); and W. Kip VIScusi, The Social Costs of Punitive 
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285, 312-13 
(1998). 
5. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 592-94 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, CJ.); Zaro Designs v. 
L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & 
Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). 
6. I discuss this work infra in Part II. 
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achieve optimal levels of deterrence only if the multiplier is 
calculated on a case-by-case basis, so that the multiplier varies with 
each defendant's probability of punishment. 
Significantly, few legal regimes follow the traditional multiplier 
in this respect, for few (if any) use multipliers that are calculated 
case-by-case. Often no multiplier is used and only compensatory 
damages are awarded, as in most civil suits under the common law. 
When the law does use a multiplier, it is often set at a single value 
that is the same for all defendants, as in the treble damage rule of 
antitrust law.7 And when criminal or administrative penalties are 
used, it is common to set a single fine for all violations of a certain 
type (e.g., $100 for failing to stop at a stop sign), regardless of either 
the harm caused or the probability of punishment. Obviously, none 
of these systems of punishment satisfies the traditional, case-by­
case multiplier principle. 
The fact that real legal systems usually use some alternative to a 
case-by-case multiplier raises two questions for those interested in 
deterrence. First, when (if ever) might these alternatives be 
superior to the case-by-case multiplier? Second, whether or not 
they are superior, at what level should the fines or penalties be set 
(under each of these alternatives) to get the best deterrence 
possible? A naYve view might hold that when the law uses one of 
the alternatives, the best policy would still set the fine or other 
penalty as close as possible to the level of the case-by-case 
multiplier. But this nai'.ve view is incorrect, for - as recent work in 
law and economics has also shown - each of these alternatives 
requires a different level of penalties to achieve optimal deterrence. 
Unfortunately, these differences are not widely understood in 
mainstream legal analysis, which continues to be fixed on the more 
traditional theory in which the multiplier is adjusted case by case. 
Part II explores these differences by identifying the optimal 
fines or damage awards8 under each of the possible alternatives. If 
the law uses the same multiplier for all defendants, optimal 
deterrence will usually require a penalty below the traditional 
multiplier principle. If the law instead uses a single fine for all 
defendants, as opposed to a single multiplier, the optimal fine could 
be either above or below the level of the multiplier principle, 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994). 
8. In most of the article, I will speak of fines and damage awards interchangeably, 
without regard to whether they are paid to the victims (the usual rule for damages) or to the 
state (the usual rule for fines). While there are of course important differences between each 
of these penalties, most of those differences do not alter the resulting deterrent effect. 
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depending on (among other things) how rapidly the probability of 
punishment changes if a defendant commits a more or a less 
egregious offense. Indeed, this last factor - the responsiveness of 
the probability of punishment to changes in the egregiousness of an 
offense - is an important determinant of the optimal penalty under 
each of the alternatives discussed here. For this reason, Part III of 
the article discusses the factors that could make the probability of 
punishment more or less responsive to the degree of a defendant's 
offense. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the first question identified above, by 
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives 
relative to a case-by-case multiplier. The alternatives clearly differ 
in their computational complexity, and in the informational and 
other demands they place on judges and juries (or on legislatures) . 
They may also differ in other key respects, such as their effect on 
litigation costs or on defendants' overall levels of activity, or on the 
law's symbolic or expressive effects. In the end, I conclude that 
remedies based on the traditional multiplier principle may well be 
useful, and may even dominate the alternatives, in a fairly small set 
of cases. In other cases, however, the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages is harder to assess. 
I. THE TRADmoNAL MULTIPLIER PRINCIPLE 
At the outset, it will help to distinguish between two ways of 
achieving optimal deterrence: by adjusting the penalty, and by ad­
justing the substantive legal standard. Suppose, for example, that 
we wish to reduce the risk of leaks of toxic waste, and that the opti­
mal level of precautions would reduce that risk to exactly 1 % . One 
way to achieve this goal is to set a substantive legal standard under 
which defendants are liable if but only if their risk exceeds that 
level. If the substantive standard is set correctly, and if it can be 
applied with no risk of error - two qualifications that will become 
important below - it may not matter if the penalty for violating the 
standard is set according to the multiplier principle. In such a re­
gime, all that matters is that the penalty be large enough to deter 
defendants from violating the substantive legal standard, so any 
penalty set at this level or higher will achieve optimal deterrence. 
Indeed, as long as defendants who comply with the substantive 
standard can be assured of not paying any penalties at all, the pen­
alty could (in theory) be increased to infinity without inducing 
overdeterrence, because defendants could always avoid any penalty 
by complying with the substantive standard. In such a regime, 
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therefore, any increases in the penalty above the minimum level 
needed to induce compliance with the standard would not affect the 
behavior chosen by defendants.9 
In most legal regimes, however, the size of the penalty will have 
a continuous effect on defendants' behavior. For example, if the 
law holds defendants strictly liable for every leak, it will then be 
impossible for defendants to insulate themselves from liability sim­
ply by complying with any substantive legal standard. The same is 
true if there is no official rule of strict liability but if the substantive 
standard is applied with some risk of error, so that even a defendant 
whose leaks are within the officially permitted level still faces some 
chance of being held liable. As long as defendants face some 
chance of being held liable, every increase in the penalty will 
strengthen the incentive to reduce their number of leaks. At some 
point, then, if the penalty is set too high, the incentive will grow too 
strong and there will be too much deterrence. In short, optimal 
deterrence in such a regime requires that the penalty be set at ex­
actly the right level, not merely that it be at or above some 
minimum. 
My focus in this article is on regimes of the second type, for that 
is where the multiplier principle is most relevant.10 Whenever de­
fendants cannot avoid any chance of liability, the average or ex­
pected liability is what governs the deterrence incentives. For 
example, if there is only one chance in four that they will actually 
be found liable, defendants will discount the penalty by 25% in cal­
culating how much they could save by reducing their leaks. This 
discounting supplies the rationale for the multiplier principle, for it 
seems to imply that deterrence will be reduced unless the penalty is 
multiplied by four, to offset the 25% probability of punishment. 
However, this conclusion (that the law's deterrent effect will be 
reduced without a multiplier) requires one additional assumption: 
that the probability of punishment is unaltered by any changes in a 
defendant's behavior. Subsection I.A below shows the role this as­
sumption plays in the traditional analysis of multipliers. Subsection 
I.B then relaxes this assumption, to show why the multiplier princi­
ple is not necessary for optimal deterrence if the assumption is 
invalid. 
9. This point is developed at more length in Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1524-27 {1984). I will return to it infra in section 11.C. 
10. The application of the multiplier principle (and of punitive damages generally) to 
regimes of the first sort is discussed in Hylton, supra note �· 
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A. Assuming the Probability of Punishment Stays Constant 
Suppose that a firm's activities pose a 1 % risk of leaking toxic 
waste in a way that would cause $6 million worth of damages.11 
The average or expected costs of this activity would thus be $60,000 
(.01 x $6,000,000). Suppose, though, that the firm could alter its 
operations to eliminate that risk and replace it with a 1 % risk of a 
less serious leak that would cause only $5 million in damages, thus 
reducing the expected costs to $50,000 (.01 x $5,000,000). This 
means that the alteration would reduce the expected social costs of 
this activity by $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). The alteration is there­
fore socially efficient if, but only if, its cost is less than $10,000. 
If enforcement is perfect - that is, if the firm knows that it will 
have to pay for all damages its leaks cause - then the firm's aver­
age liability will be $60,000 if it does not alter its operations and 
$50,000 if it does. By altering its operations, the firm can thus save 
$10,000 in expected liability ($60,000 - $50,000). Since $10,000 is 
also the social benefit from the alteration, the firm's incentives will 
be socially optimal. That is, the firm will have an incentive to make 
the alteration if, but only if, the cost of doing so is less than $10,000. 
Now suppose that enforcement is instead imperfect, and that 
even if there is a leak the firm faces only a 25% chance of being 
held liable. The firm might then reason as follows: "If we do not 
alter our operations, then whenever there is a leak (i.e., in 1 % of 
the cases) we will face a 25% probability of having to pay $6 million 
in damages. This is equivalent to an expected liability of $15,000 
(.01 x .25 x $6,000,000). If we instead alter our operations, we will 
face a 25% chance of having to pay only $5 million, so our expected 
liability will decline to $12,500 (.01 x .25 x $5,000,000). But this 
shows that altering our operations would reduce our expected lia­
bility by only $2,500 ($15,000 - $12,5000)." This provides too little 
incentive for the firm to alter its operations, since the social gain 
from the alteration would still be $10,000 (not $2,500). This is the 
reasoning behind the multiplier principle: if the chance of having to 
pay damages is only 25%, the firm will discount the expected penal­
ties undesirably, and the incentive to improve its behavior will be 
weakened.12 
11. This example is similar to one used by Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 879-80. 
Like them, I assume that all the relevant costs and benefits can be measured (or at least 
approximated) numerically. 
12. More precisely, the deterrent effect will be reduced if the firm believes that the 
probability of punishment is only 25%: it is the firm's beliefs about the probability that 
matter. In the discussion that follows, this qualification will be assumed. For a further dis-
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This example also shows that if the measure of damages were 
multiplied by four, the firm's incentives would be optimal again. If 
damages were multiplied by four, the firm would then have to pay 
$24 million ( 4 x $6,000,000) if it caused a leak and had not altered 
its operations, and would have to pay $20 million ( 4 x $5,000,000) if 
it had altered its operations. This gives the firm an average or ex­
pected liability of $60,000 without the alteration (.01 x .25 x 
$24,000,000), compared to $50,000 with the alteration (.01 x .25 x 
$20,000,000), so the alteration would reduce the firm's expected lia­
bility by $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). A multiplier of four thus re­
stores the equality between the private gain to the firm and the gain 
to society at large. This is because a multiplier of four exactly com­
pensates for the 25% chance of being held liable. 
Examples such as this are what give the multiplier principle its 
air of inevitability. Notice, though, that this example assumed that 
the probability of punishment stayed fixed at 25% whether or not 
the firm altered its operations. The firm's expected liability was cal­
culated on the assumption that if it failed to make any alterations, it 
faced a 25% probability of paying $24 million in damages; while if it 
did make the alterations, it faced the same 25% probability of 
paying $20 million in damages. In other words, the example as­
sumed that the probability of having to pay damages stayed the 
same regardless of the firm's actual behavior. 
As noted earlier, more recent work in law and economics has 
relaxed this assumption by considering legal regimes in which the 
probability of punishment depends in part on how well the defend­
ant has behaved.13 The following subsection explains the implica-
cussion of this aspect of deterrence theory, see Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive 
Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 237, 247-51. 
13. The earliest analyses include CHARLES J. GoETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 299-303 (1984); STEVEN SHA VELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 
93-99 (1987); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984); and Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, 
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 279 (1986). Other work will 
be cited below where it is relevant. 
Another (and much larger) line of literature addresses the fact that the probability of 
punishment can also be altered by increased expenditures on detection and enforcement, or 
by other improvements to the enforcement system as a whole. For examples of this literature 
- a literature that also traces its origins to Becker, supra note 1 - see A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 
AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1979); or Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 
99 J. POI .. EcoN. 1088 (1991). My concern in this article, however, is with the extent to which 
the probability of punishment varies with changes in an individual defendant's behavior. I 
therefore will not address any policies that might alter the probability of punishment across 
the board, while still leaving that probability unaffected by changes in an individual defend­
ant's behavior. 
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tions of this work, and shows why the multiplier principle may no 
longer be necessary for optimal deterrence. 
B. Relaxing the Constant Probability Assumption 
In many contexts, the probability of punishment declines if de­
fendants reduce the riskiness of their behavior or if they behave 
better along any other dimension. Some reasons for the lower 
probability of punishment will be discussed in Part III - for exam­
ple, the public authorities may be less likely to prosecute a firm that 
appears to be making a good-faith effort to reduce the severity of 
its leaks, or such a firm might be better able to convince a court that 
it has not violated the applicable legal standard. For now, the exact 
reason for the reduced probability of punishment does not matter, 
as long as the probability does in fact decline. 
If the probability of punishment does decline when a defendant 
improves its behavior, this produces two offsetting effects. The fact 
that the probability of punishment is still less than 100% will 
weaken the law's deterrent effect, just as in the earlier example. 
But if the probability of punishment falls even lower when the de­
fendant improves its behavior, this will strengthen the law's deter­
rent effect, because improved behavior will then bring an extra 
"reward" in the form of a lower probability of punishment. And 
since there is no logical connection between the size of these two 
effects, it is possible for either one to outweigh the other, leading 
either to a net weakening effect (and net underdeterrence) or a net 
strengthening effect (net overdeterrence ). Indeed, it is even possi­
ble for both effects to exactly offset, leaving deterrence at just the 
optimal level.14 
These possibilities can all be illustrated using the toxic waste ex­
ample. Let us now suppose that the probability of punishment is 
still 25% if the firm does not alter its operations, but only 10% if it 
does. If no multiplier is used, the firm will still face an expected 
liability of $15,000 if it does not alter its operations (.01 x .25 x 
$6,000,000), but if it does alter its operations its expected liability 
will fall to $5,000 (.01 x .10 x $5,000,000). This means that altering 
its operations will reduce the firm's expected liability by $10,000 
($15,000 - $5,000). But $10,000 is also the social gain from the al­
teration, so the firm's private savings will once again equal the 
social savings. In other words, even with imperfect enforcement 
14. For a mathematical demonstration of all three possibilities, see Craswell & Calfee, 
supra note 13, at 284 tbl.1. 
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and no damage multiplier at all, it is still possible for the firm's in­
centives to be optimal. 
Of course, it is only by coincidence (or by careful selection of 
the hypothetical numbers) that the firm's incentives would be ex­
actly optimal. If extra precautions did not reduce the probability of 
punishment quite as much, so that probability fell from 25% to 
some figure above 10%, the firm's savings in expected liability 
would then be less than $10,000, which would give the firm too 
weak an incentive (net underdeterrence). Conversely, if the extra 
precautions reduced the probability of punishment even more, to 
some figure even less than 10%, the firm's savings would then be 
more than $10,000, and the firm would have too strong an incentive 
(net overdeterrence ). The net effect on the firm's incentives thus 
depends critically on the rate at which the probability of punish­
ment falls as the firm improves its behavior. In economic terms, it 
is the marginal change in the expected penalty, and not its absolute 
level, that governs the firm's incentives. 
C. Adjusting the Multiplier Case-by-Case 
Even when the multiplier principle is not strictly necessary for 
optimal deterrence, it could still provide one way of achieving that 
goal. To be sure, we just saw that if extra precautions reduced the 
probability of punishment from 25% to 10%, then defendants 
would have optimal incentives without any multiplier at all. In such 
a case, it might seem that any multiplier would be a bad idea, 
because it could only strengthen the deterrent effect and lead to 
overdeterrence. However, this intuition must be discarded when 
the probability of punishment is not a constant. In this section, I 
show that optimal deterrence can still be achieved using the tradi­
tional multiplier principle, but only if the multiplier is calculated sep­
arately for each defendant, based on each defendant's actual 
probability of punishment. 
Consider again the example from the preceding subsection. In 
that example, defendants who did not take extra precautions faced 
a 25% probability of punishment. If the multiplier is recalculated 
case by case, these defendants will still be given a multiplier of four, 
so they will still have to pay $24 million ( 4 x $6,000,000) if they are 
found liable. Their average or expected liability will thus be 
$60,000 (.01 x .25 x $24,000,000). However, if defendants who do 
take the extra precautions face only a 10% probability of punish­
ment, they would be assigned a multiplier of ten (if the multiplier is 
recalculated case by case). These defendants will therefore have to 
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pay $50 million (10 x $5,000,000) whenever they are found liable, so 
their expected liability will be $50,000 (.01 x .10 x $50,000,000).1s 
This means that defendants' incentives will be optimal again, be­
cause taking the extra precautions will reduce their expected liabil­
ity by $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000), which just equals the social gain 
from those precautions. 
In short, even when the multiplier principle is not absolutely 
necessary for optimal deterrence, it may still be sufficient to achieve 
that goal. As long as the probability of punishment (whether 25% 
or 10%) is offset by just the right multiplier, the effect will be the 
same as if enforcement were perfect, and defendants will be made 
to feel the full costs of their behavior. 
1. Case-by-Case Multipliers as "Taxes" on Improvements 
It is instructive to compare this conclusion with the one reached 
in the preceding subsection, when optimal deterrence was achieved 
even without any damage multiplier. In the preceding subsection, 
we saw that the decline in the probability of punishment (from 25% 
to 10%) could itself be enough to create optimal incentives, thus 
achieving optimal deterrence even though defendants paid only the 
actual costs of their behavior ($6 million and $5 million, respec­
tively).16 Yet the example just discussed showed that optimal deter­
rence could also be achieved if the penalties were increased through 
a multiplier - and increased quite dramatically, to $24 million and 
$50 million respectively. But this might seem paradoxical: How 
can a dramatic increase in penalties leave the law with the same 
deterrent effect? 
The explanation lies in the fact that, while a case-by-case multi­
plier does increase penalties overall, it also introduces a new factor 
that checks any tendency to overdeterrence. If the multiplier is re­
calculated in every case, defendants who improve their behavior 
will (in effect) be "taxed" on that improvement, by being subjected 
to a larger multiplier if and when they are found liable. In the ex­
ample just discussed, defendants who took extra precautions re­
duced their probability of punishment (from 25% to 10%) and 
thereby increased their multiplier (from four to ten). This tax, in 
the form of a higher multiplier, counteracted what would otherwise 
15. Notice that the penalty assessed against these defendants ($50 million) will be larger 
than the penalty assessed against defendants who did not take the extra precautions ($24 
million). The possibility that this relationship might offend notions of corrective justice will 
be discussed infra in section IV.G. 
16. See supra text following note 14. 
2196 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:2185 
be an incentive for overdeterrence. As long as the multiplier is re­
calculated whenever the probability of punishment declines, the net 
effects should exactly offset and defendants should have just the 
optimal incentives.17 
Indeed, the same analysis would apply even if the original incen­
tives (in the absence of any multiplier) had favored overdeterrence. 
For example, if taking extra precautions reduced the probability of 
punishment from 25% to less than 10%, the reward for taking those 
precautions would then be even greater (in the absence of a multi­
plier), leading to too much deterrence. But if a multiplier is used, 
and if the multiplier is calculated separately for each defendant, de­
fendants who take extra precautions would then face an even 
higher tax, for their new multiplier would be even greater than ten 
(because their probability of punishment would be less than 10% ). 
Paradoxical as it may seem, increasing penalties can sometimes re­
duce the law's deterrent effect, as long as the extent of the increase 
itself responds (through changes in the multiplier) to each change in 
a defendant's behavior. 
2. The Effect of a Constant Multiplier 
The preceding analysis also shows why the multiplier, to have 
this effect, must be recalculated in every case, so that it changes 
with each defendant's actual behavior. If the multiplier is instead 
fixed at some constant level, it no longer leads to optimal 
deterrence. 
The toxic waste example can illustrate this point as well. In that 
example, the average probability of punishment was somewhere 
between 10% and 25%. Suppose, for the sake of concreteness, that 
this average was exactly 20% (as would be the case if one-third of 
all defendants took the extra precautions but two-thirds did not). If 
the damage multiplier were set at a constant based on this average 
probability of punishment, all defendants would be given a multi­
plier of five. This means that defendants who did not take extra 
precautions would have to pay $30 million in damages (5 x 
$6,000,000) each time they were caught, while defendants who did 
take extra precautions would have to pay only $25 million in dam­
ages (5 x $5,000,000). 
Unfortunately, these penalties will create too much deterrence. 
Defendants who do not take extra precautions will now face ex­
pected liabilities of $75,000 (.01 x .25 x $30,000,000), while defend-
17. For a mathematical proof, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 292 n.18. 
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ants who do take extra precautions will face expected liabilities of 
$25,000 (.01 x .10 x $25,000,000). Thus, defendants who take the 
extra precautions will be rewarded with a $50,000 reduction in their 
expected liability ($75,000 - $25,000). But the true social savings 
from these precautions are still only $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000), so 
this $50,000 reward is too large and will lead to overdeterrence. 
Notice, too, that the problem is not just that a constant multi­
plier will not be sufficiently fine-tuned, in the sense that any con­
stant will be too high for some defendants and too low for others.18 
To the contrary, overdeterrence can still be a problem even if the 
constant multiplier is set at a level that is not "too high" (according 
to the traditional principle) for any individual defendant. In the 
example just considered, the highest probability of punishment was 
25%, for defendants who did not take the extra precautions. If we 
follow the traditional multiplier analysis, a multiplier of four would 
be just right for those defendants and too low for all others (those 
for whom the probability of punishment was only 10% ). And if a 
multiplier of four is just right for some and too low for others, it 
might seem as though that multiplier would have to yield too little 
deterrence on balance. 
In fact, though, a multiplier of four will still produce too much 
deterrence if it is applied as a constant. With a constant multiplier 
of four, defendants who do not take the precautions will have to 
pay $24 million in damages ( 4 x $6,000,000) each time they are 
caught, while defendants who do take the precautions will have to 
pay $20 million ( 4 x $5,000,000). This means that defendants who 
do not take the precautions now face an expected liability of 
$60,000 (.01 x .25 x $24,000,000), while defendants who do take the 
precautions face an expected liability of $20,000 (.01 x .10 x 
$20,000,000). As a result, defendants can now save $40,000 in ex­
pected liability ($60,000 - $20,000) by taking the precautions, and 
this is still far more than the $10,000 social value of the precautions. 
Thus, a constant multiplier can still lead to overdeterrence even 
when it seems "just right" for some defendants (according to the 
traditional multiplier principle) and "too low" for all others. 
While this conclusion, too, may seem paradoxical, it follows di­
rectly from the earlier analysis. The reason is that constant multi­
pliers - even ones set at relatively low levels - eliminate the "tax" 
referred to earlier. As we have seen, a case-by-case multiplier taxes 
18. Polinsky and Shaven emphasize this objection to constant multipliers. See Polinsky & 
Shaven, supra note 3, at 893. 
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defendants whose behavior improves by giving them a higher multi­
plier (to correspond to their lower probability of punishment). A 
constant multiplier eliminates this "tax," but it still increases the 
overall deterrent effect by increasing all penalties across the board. 
By thus increasing the size of all penalties without any offsetting 
"tax," constant multipliers can easily produce too much deterrence, 
just as in the example above. In fact, to achieve the optimal level of 
deterrence a constant multiplier will usually have to be set below 
the traditional multiplier principle (as the following Part will 
discuss). 
I!. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO OPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
As noted in the introduction, 19 most legal systems do not use 
multipliers that are calculated case by case. Instead, they use multi­
pliers set at the same level for all defendants, or fines set at the 
same level for all defendants, or compensatory damages with no 
multipliers at all. Accordingly, it is important to understand how 
penalties should be set to achieve optimal deterrence under each of 
these alternative approaches - and how those penalties would dif­
fer from the more familiar, case-by-case multiplier principle. 
In this Part, I show that constant multipliers can achieve optimal 
deterrence if they are set at some suitably lower level (lower, that 
is, than the traditional multiplier principle). Constant fines can also 
achieve optimal deterrence, usually by being set below the tradi­
tional multiplier principle, but sometimes by being set above that 
level. Optimal deterrence might also be achieved by reforms that 
do not involve any multiplier at all - for example, by caps on the 
highest possible damage awards, or by changing the substantive 
legal standard. Thus, while the traditional multiplier principle may 
perhaps be sufficient for optimal deterrence, it is not at all 
necessary. 
A. The Optimal Constant Multiplier 
The toxic waste example has already shown how a constant mul­
tiplier set at 1.0 could still achieve optimal deterrence. In that ex­
ample, extra precautions reduced the probability of punishment 
from 25% to 10%, and that effect by itself was enough to reduce 
defendants' expected liability by $10,000.20 Since $10,000 was also 
the social benefit produced by the extra precautions, this meant 
19. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
20. See supra text following note 14. 
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that defendants had the optimal incentives even with no multiplier 
at all. But using no multiplier at all, and merely awarding compen­
satory damages, is equivalent to multiplying the damages by one in 
every case. And if enforcement is imperfect, a multiplier of one will 
be below the level recommended by the traditional multiplier prin­
ciple, which in this example would have been between four and ten 
(because the probability of punishment ranged from 25% to 10%). 
In short, we have already seen one example where optimal deter­
rence was achieved using a constant multiplier below the optimal 
case-by-case multiplier. 
Of course, there is no reason to think that the optimal constant 
multiplier will always equal one. Indeed, if we change the example 
slightly, so extra precautions reduce the probability of punishment 
from 25% to only 20%, the constant multiplier will then have to be 
larger. In this revised example, defendants who take no extra pre­
cautions will face expected liability of $15,000 (.01 x .25 x 
$6,000,000) if no multiplier is used, but defendants who do take the 
precautions will face expected liability of $10,000 (.01 x .20 x 
$5,000,000). Defendants who take the precautions will thus be re­
warded with only a $5,000 reduction in expected liability ($15,000 -
$10,000), and this reward is less than the social value of the precau­
tions, which is still $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). In this case, then, 
defendants will have too little incentive to take the extra precau­
tions. To correct this problem, the multiplier must be greater than 
one in order to magnify the reward for taking extra precautions. In 
this example, the optimal constant multiplier happens to be exactly 
two.21 
To be sure, a constant multiplier of two is still less than the opti­
mal case-by-case multiplier under the traditional multiplier princi­
ple, for that multiplier would now be somewhere between four and 
five (based on a probability of punishment ranging from 25% to 
20% ). In this new example, though, the optimal constant multiplier 
is not as far below the lower end of this range as it was in the origi­
nal example, where the optimal constant multiplier was only one. 
This is because the new example features a probability of punish­
ment that is less responsive to improvements in defendants' behav-
21. The full calculations are as follows. With a constant multiplier of two, defendants 
who do not take extra precautions will have to pay $12 million when they are caught (2 x 
$6,000,000), while defendants who do take extra precautions will have to pay $10 million (2 x 
$5,000,000). This gives defendants an expected liability of $30,000 if they do not take precau­
tions (.01 x .25 x $12,000,000), as compared to an expected liability of $20,000 (.01 x .20 x 
$10,000,000) if they do take precautions. The savings in expected liability is therefore $10,000 
($30,000 - $20,000), which again equals the social benefit from the precautions. 
2200 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2185 
ior: taking extra precautions in the new example brings just a slight 
reduction in the probability of punishment, from 25% to 20%. The 
lesson here is that the rate at which the probability of punishment 
declines is a key factor in determining how low a constant multi­
plier should be. · 
Indeed, if the probability of punishment were to decline even 
faster with each improvement in a defendant's behavior, the opti­
mal constant multiplier would be even smaller - and could even be 
less than one, implying that even compensatory damages would be 
too high. To see this, let us alter the example so that extra precau­
tions reduce the probability of punishment from 25% all the way 
down to 5 % . If no multiplier is used, defendants who do not take 
the precautions would still face expected liabilities of $15,000 Gust 
as before), but defendants who do take the precautions would face 
expected liabilities of $2,500 (.01 x .05 x $5,000,000). This gives 
each defendant who takes the precautions a $12,500 reduction in its 
expected liability ($15,000 - $2,500). But this $12,500 reward is 
greater than the social value of those precautions (which is still 
$10,000) , so these penalties will lead to overdeterrence. To dampen 
defendants' incentives and achieve optimal deterrence, any con­
stant multiplier would have to be set at some value less than one. 
In this example, the optimal constant multiplier happens to be 0.80, 
which is equivalent to holding defendants liable for only 80% of the 
harm caused by their behavior. Even though defendants are clearly 
paying less than the full social costs of their behavior, their incen­
tives are still socially optimal.22 
Of course, a multiplier of 0.80 is much less than the traditional 
case-by-case multiplier, which in this example would be somewhere 
between four and twenty (based on probabilities of punishment 
between 25% and 5% ). In general, the more the probability of 
punishment declines with any improvement in a defendant's behav­
ior, the greater will be the divergence between the optimal constant 
multiplier and the optimal case-by-case multiplier. As long as the 
probability of punishment declines at all, though, the optimal con­
stant multiplier will almost always be less than the optimal case-by­
case multiplier. More precisely, the optimal constant multiplier will 
22. With a constant multiplier of 0.80, defendants who do not take extra precautions will 
have to pay only $4.8 million each time they are caught (.80 x $6,000,000), while defendants 
who do take extra precautions will have to pay $4 million (.80 x $5,000,000). This gives 
defendants an expected liability of $12,000 if they do not take the extra precautions (.01 x .25 
x $4,800,000), compared to an expected liability of only $2,000 (.01 x .05 x $4,000,000) if they 
do take extra precautions. This makes the savings in expected liability again equal to $10,000 
($12,000 - $2,000), which is still the social value of the extra precautions. 
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never be greater than the optimal case-by-case multiplier, and will 
usually be less.23 
The reason for this follows from the analysis given earlier. We 
have already seen that the traditional multiplier will create optimal 
incentives if that multiplier is adjusted on a case-by-case basis to 
reflect each improvement in a defendant's behavior. We have also 
seen that this case-by-case adjustment operates as a kind of a tax, 
which penalizes defendants whose behavior improves by making 
them face a larger multiplier (to correspond to their reduced 
probability of punishment). Making the multiplier a constant takes 
away this tax on improvements and thus strengthens the incentives 
to make such improvements. But if the case-by-case multiplier 
(including the tax on improvements) had been creating exactly the 
optimal incentives, any change that strengthens those incentives 
will make them too strong, leading to net overdeterrence. The only 
way to correct this problem (while still employing a constant multi­
plier) is to reduce the size of the multiplier, reducing the deterrent 
effect. This is why the optimal constant multiplier will usually be 
less than, and can never be greater than, the optimal case-by-case 
multiplier. 
The size of the optimal constant multiplier will also depend on 
the expected damage award facing a defendant whose behavior is at 
or very near the socially optimal level. In the original toxic waste 
example, defendants who took the socially efficient level of precau­
tions expected that a leak would occur in 1 % of all cases, and that 
they would then face a 10% chance of having to pay damages of $5 
million (before any multiplier was applied). This prospect left these 
defendants facing an expected liability of $50,000 (.01 x .10 x 
$5,000,000). But if that figure were either higher or lower, the law's 
deterrent effect would be altered, requiring a corresponding adjust­
ment in the size of the constant multiplier. 
To see this, let us change the original example to make the toxic 
waste slightly more hazardous, so that a leak now causes $8 million 
in damages (rather than $6 million) if no extra precautions are 
taken, and $7 million in damages (rather than $5 million) if the de­
fendant does take extra precautions. Since both figures have 
increased by the same amount, the social efficiency of the precau­
tions will be just what it was before: the precautions will still reduce 
23. For a mathematical proof, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 297 & n.25. 
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expected social costs by $10,000.24 However, this change in the ab­
solute levels of harm reduces the optimal constant multiplier. In 
the earlier example where the damage caused by a leak was either 
$6 million or $5 million, and extra precautions reduced the 
probability of punishment from 25% to only 20%, we saw that the 
optimal constant multiplier was exactly two.25 If we use these same 
probabilities in this new example, though, the optimal constant 
multiplier falls to 1.67.26 
The reason why the absolute size of the damages matter is that 
this affects the significance (to the defendant) of the rate at which 
the probability of punishment declines. In both of these examples, 
the extra precautions reduced the probability of punishment by the 
same amount, from 25% to 20%. In the first example, though, this 
represented a reduction of five percentage points in the probability 
of paying $6 or $7 million (before any multiplier was applied), while 
in the second case it represented a reduction of five percentage 
points in the probability of having to pay $7 or $8 million. Obvi­
ously, the second reduction is more valuable to defendants than the 
first, so the second offers stronger incentives for defendants to im­
prove their behavior. As a result, any constant multiplier that was 
optimal in the first case will be too strong in the second case, and 
therefore will have to be reduced. This is just what happened in the 
example itself: the optimal constant multiplier fell from 2.0 to 1.67. 
This shows that the optimal level for a constant multiplier depends 
both on the rate at which the probability of punishment declines 
and on the absolute level of damages that are expected when de­
fendants behave optimally. 
Of course, the absolute level of these damages depends partly 
on the technology of the defendant's activity - for example, what 
kind of waste is involved, and just how toxic is it? But the level of 
damages may also be affected by other legal rules, especially the 
rules governing causation. For example, if a defendant who failed 
24. In this new example, the expected social costs of the defendants' behavior are $80,000 
(.01 x $8,000,000) if they do not take the extra precautions, and $70,000 (.01 x $7,000,000) if 
they do. The social value of the extra precautions is therefore $10,000 ($80,000 - $70,000). 
25. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
26. With a constant multiplier of 1.67, defendants who do not take the extra precautions 
will have to pay $13.33 million each time they are caught (1.67 x $8,000,000), while defend· 
ants who do take the precautions will have to pay $11.67 million (1.6 x $7,000,000). This 
gives defendants an expected liability of $33,333 if they do not take the precautions (.01 x .25 
x $13,333,333), compared to an expected liability of $23,333 (.01 x .20 x $11,666,667) if they 
do, so defendants can save $10,000 in expected liability by taking the precautions ($33,333 -
$23,333). This $10,000 savings exactly equals the precautions' social value, so defendants' 
incentives will be socially optimal. 
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to take the appropriate precautions can prove that the same leak 
would have occurred even if all appropriate precautions had been 
taken, and that the same victims would still have suffered $7 million 
in damages (rather than the $8 million in damages they actually suf­
fered), the rules of causation will sometimes reduce such a defend­
ant's liability to only $1 million, reflecting the incremental harm 
attributable to its failure to take proper care.27 If damages are con­
sistently reduced in this way, the optimal constant multiplier will be 
larger, because a larger multiplier will be needed to achieve the 
same deterrent effect. In this example, the optimal constant multi­
plier would equal four.28 Of course, a multiplier of four would also 
satisfy the traditional multiplier principle, based on a probability of 
punishment of 25%. 
This conclusion holds more generally: whenever a causation 
rule of this sort is applied without error, the optimal constant multi­
plier will always be just as great as (though no greater than) the 
optimal case-by-case multiplier.29 If such a causation rule is per­
fectly applied, a defendant who takes the socially optimal level of 
care should never have to pay any damages at all. Such a defendant 
will therefore be unconcerned with the probability that it might be 
held liable, and will thus be unaffected by the rate at which that 
probability might change if the defendant were to deviate slightly 
from the socially efficient level of care. But if the deterrent effect 
wiJ1 be the same regardless of the rate at which that probability 
changes, this means that the deterrent effect will be the same as it 
would have been in a world where the probability of punishment 
did not change at all. And in a world where the probability of pun­
ishment did not change at all, there would be no difference between 
the optimal constant multiplier and the optimal case-by-case multi­
plier, because in such a world no case-by-case adjustments would 
ever be required. This is why a perfectly applied causation rule sup-
27. See sources cited infra note 30. 
28. The full calculations are as follows. Defendants who do not take extra precautions 
will be charged with incremental damages of $1 million, for the reasons discussed in the text. 
A multiplier of four means that these defendants will have to pay $4 million each time they 
are caught (4 x $1,000,000), leaving them with an expected liability of $10,000 (.01 x .25 x 
$4,000,000). However, defendants who do take extra precautions will not be charged with 
any losses at all (under this incremental damage rule), so their expected liability will be zero. 
This means that defendants can save $10,000 in expected liability ($10,000 minus 0) by taking 
the precautions - which is just what the socially optimal incentives require. 
29. For mathematical analyses of this relationship, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, 
at 295-97; Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 
18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 427, 437-39 .(1989). For a more qualitative discussion, see Mark F .  Grady, 
Punitive Damages and State of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1197, 
1201-09 (1989). 
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plies the limiting case in which there is no effective difference 
between the optimal constant multiplier and the optimal case-by­
case multiplier. 
It should be stressed, however, that this is indeed a limiting case. 
If the causation rule is not applied perfectly, but instead involves 
any risk of error, then even defendants who take socially efficient 
precautions will always face at least some expected liability, so they 
will care about the rate at which the probability of punishment 
changes. More important, the rules of causation often are not ap­
plied in precisely the way that the earlier example assumed.3° For 
instance, if the efficient level of care would have led to a different 
kind of accident, or to an accident whose losses would have fallen 
on different victims, defendants' liability generally is not limited to 
the incremental losses above and beyond those that would have 
been imposed if they had taken the efficient level of care. The same 
is true when the expected losses (at any level of care) are entirely 
probabilistic, so the most that defendants can show is that a similar 
accident might have happened even if they had taken the efficient 
level of care. In such a case, defendants' liability usually is not re­
duced by the statistical or expected value of the losses that might 
have occurred even if they had behaved efficiently. Obviously, 
there will also be no reduction of their liability in any regime of 
strict liability, where defendants are held liable for the full costs 
regardless of whether they behaved efficiently. And if (for any of 
these reasons) defendants' liability is not limited to the purely 
incremental losses, the optimal constant multiplier will then be less 
than the multiplier principle. Often it will be less by a considerable 
margin, as in most of the examples considered above. 
To summarize, the optimal constant multiplier can never exceed 
the optimal case-by-case multiplier, and only rarely will it equal 
that level. Instead, in most cases the optimal constant multiplier 
will be less than the optimal case-by-case multiplier, meaning that a 
constant multiplier can achieve optimal levels of deterrence without 
satisfying the multiplier principle. Moreover, the extent to which 
the optimal constant multiplier falls below the multiplier principle 
depends on two factors: (a) the rate at which the probability of 
punishment falls with improvements in a defendant's behavior, and 
(b) the absolute level of expected damages facing a defendant who 
30. For discussions of the actual legal rules, see Cooter, supra note 3; Grady, supra note 
29; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi· 
sion of the Tort System, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 849, 862-66 (1984). I discuss the deterrent effect of 
other causation rules at more length infra in section 111.D. 
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behaves in the socially optimal way. Only when one of these fac­
tors is eliminated - that is, when the probability of punishment 
never changes at all, or when defendants who behave optimally can 
be assured of paying no damages - only then will the optimal con­
stant multiplier be the same as the optimal case-by-case multiplier. 
B. The Optimal Constant Fine 
Another route to optimal deterrence involves the use of a con­
stant fine, in which every defendant who is found liable pays the 
same total amount. For example, traffic laws often impose the same 
fine for every violation of a certain type, regardless of the actual 
damage caused by the violation. A constant fine is slightly different 
from the constant multiplier discussed in the preceding section, for 
a constant multiplier allows the total penalty (the multiplier times 
the harm caused) to vary from defendant to defendant. By con­
trast, a constant fine keeps the total penalty the same for all 
defendants. 
The significance of this distinction is that a constant multiplier 
gives defendants two reasons to improve their behavior, while a 
constant fine gives them only one. Under a constant multiplier, de­
fendants who improve their behavior will be rewarded with a lower 
probability of being punished, as emphasized in the preceding sec­
tions of this article. But defendants who improve their behavior 
will also be rewarded with a reduction in the damages to which any 
multiplier will be applied, because improved behavior should (if it 
is truly an "improvement") inflict lower social costs. Indeed, both 
of these effects can be seen in the toxic waste example discussed 
earlier, because in every example there were two reasons why de­
fendants who took the extra precautions faced a lower expected lia­
bility. Defendants who took extra precautions benefited from a 
reduction in the probability of punishment, from 25% to some 
lower value; but they also benefited from a reduction in the social 
losses to which any multiplier would be applied, from $6 million 
down to $5 million (or from $8 million down to $7 million, depend­
ing on the example). 
The key point for present purposes is that a constant fine elimi­
nates the second of these effects. If the law uses a constant fine, 
defendants who improve their behavior may still be rewarded with 
a reduction in the probability of being penalized at all, but this will 
be their only reward: the amount they will have to pay if they are 
penalized will stay constant. It follows that the deterrent effects of 
a constant fine will always be less than the deterrent effects of an 
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equivalent constant multiplier. To offset this reduction in deterrent 
effect, the optimal constant fi ne will have to be larger than the opti­
mal constant multiplier.31 
This conclusion, too, is easy to see using a concrete example. In 
the toxic waste scenario, we calculated earlier that if extra precau­
tions reduced the probability of punishment from 25% to only 20%, 
the optimal constant multiplier would be exactly two.32 Using such 
a multipl ier, defendants who do not take the extra precautions will 
have to pay $12 million each time they are caught (2 x $6,000,000), 
while defendants who do take the precautions will have to pay $10 
million (2 x $5,000,000). If the legal system instead uses a constant 
fi ne, however, optimal deterrence will be achieved only if the fine is 
set at $20 million.33 Obviously, this $20 million fi ne is larger than 
the $12 million and $10 million penalties that would have been opti­
mal under a constant multiplier regime. 
At the same time, a $20 million fi ne is below the penalty called 
for by the traditional multipl ier principle. In this example, defend­
ants who do not take extra precautions still face a 25% probability 
of punishment, so the traditional multiplier principle would require 
a multiplier of four, resulting in a total penalty of $24 million (4 x 
$6,000,000). Similarly, defendants who do take the extra precau­
tions face only a 20% probability of punishment in this example, so 
for these defendants the multiplier principle requires a multiplier of 
five and a total penalty of $25 million (5 x $5,000,000). As we have 
seen, the optimal constant fi ne is only $20 million, which is less than 
either $24 million or $25 million. 
However, the optimal constant fi ne may not always be less than 
the optimal case-by-case multiplier. The optimal constant fine will 
always be greater than the optimal constant multiplier, and the opti­
mal case-by-case multiplier will also be greater than (or equal to) 
the optimal constant multipl ier. However, the relationship between 
the optimal constant fi ne and the optimal case-by-case multiplier is 
more difficult to characterize. The most that can be said is that the 
optimal constant fine will be less than the optimal case-by-case mul-
31. For a mathematical proof, compare Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 294 (deriving 
the value of the optimal constant multiplier) with id. at 297 (deriving the value of the optimal 
constant fine). 
32. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
33. With a constant fine set at $20 million, defendants will face an expected liability of 
$50,000 (.01 x .25 x $20,000,000) if they do not take the extra precautions, but an expected 
liability of only $40,000 (.01 x .20 x $20,000,000) if they do take the extra precautions. The 
savings in expected liability therefore equals $10,000 ($50,000 - $40,000), which is also the 
social value of the extra precautions. 
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tiplier whenever the probability of punishment is relatively respon­
sive to improvements in a defendant's behavior. In particular, if the 
probability of punishment declines quite rapidly with each improve­
ment in a defendant's behavior - so much that the defendant's 
incentives would be optimal, or not too suboptimal, with no multi­
plier at all - then the optimal constant fine will always be less than 
the optimal case-by-case multiplier.34 But if the probability of pun­
ishment is somewhat less responsive to improvements in a defend­
ant's behavior, the deterrent effect of a constant fine will then be 
reduced, which means that the absolute level of the fine will have to 
be raised in order to keep deterrence optimal. At some point, if the 
probability of punishment is extremely unresponsive to improve­
ments in a defendant's behavior, the optimal constant fine could 
even surpass the optimal case-by-case multiplier. In short, the rate 
at which the probability of punishment responds is again a key vari­
able - in this case, the variable that determines the size of the 
optimal fine. 
C. Adjustments to the Substantive Standard 
Another method of achieving optimal deterrence, at least under 
some legal regimes, is to raise or lower the substantive threshold for 
liability.35 For example, suppose that the optimal risk of toxic leaks 
is exactly 1 % - but suppose that the net incentives with no multi­
plier at all favor underdeterrence, so firms choose instead to permit 
a 1.5% risk. One way of correcting this underdeterrence is to make 
the substantive standard more strict, to permit no more than (say) a 
0.75% risk of toxic leaks. At this lower substantive standard, any 
firm that continued to permit a 1.5 % risk would now face a higher 
probability of detection and/or conviction, as its behavior would 
more obviously violate the new substantive standard. This increase 
in the probability of detection or conviction would give firms a 
stronger reason to reduce their levels of risk, thus increasing the 
law's deterrent effect and moving firms back toward the socially 
optimal risk of 1 % . If firms still permitted a risk of more than 1 % , 
34. A mathematical proof is available from the author upon request 
35. The possibility of changing the substantive standard to adjust for imperfect enforce­
ment is discussed in Calfee & Craswell, supra note 13, at 997-99; and in Jason S. Johnston, 
Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1385 
(1987) [hereinafter Johnston, Punitive Liability]. Note, too, that the substantive standard 
could also be raised or lowered indirectly by (for example) changing the evidentiary rules or 
the burdens of proof. For discussions of this approach, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, 
at 290-92; Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic 
Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1987). 
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then the substantive standard could be lowered even further, until 
the resulting probability of punishment gave defendants an incen­
tive to choose exactly the 1 % level. 
Of course, if the net incentives without any multiplier instead 
favored overdeterrence, the appropriate response would require re­
laxing rather than tightening the substantive standard. Either way, 
though, we could still achieve optimal deterrence without satisfying 
the traditional multiplier principle. That is, there should be some 
adjustment to the substantive legal standard that can achieve opti­
mal deterrence even if the probability of punishment remains less 
than one, and even if the fines or damage awards remain at purely 
compensatory levels (and thus fail to satisfy the traditional multi­
plier principle). This shows, again, that satisfaction of the multiplier 
principle is not always necessary for optimal deterrence. 
In addition, if the substantive standard were relaxed sufficiently, 
optimal deterrence might also be achieved with penalties above the 
multiplier principle. This can be achieved if the substantive stan­
dard is defined in such a way that it could never be applied, even 
through judicial error, to a defendant who had behaved efficiently. 
Penalties of this sort - referred to by Robert Cooter as "sanc­
tions"36 - thus require a triggering test such as "egregious behav­
ior," "gross negligence" or "reckless disregard for human safety," 
to ensure that they are never applied to efficient behavior.37 If the 
probability of the higher penalty is literally zero for any defendant 
who behaves efficiently, there will be no danger of inducing too 
many precautions, because a defendant who is already behaving ef­
ficiently will (by hypothesis) face no risk of having to pay the higher 
penalty. As further increases in the penalty should have no effect 
on these defendants, the penalty could (in theory) be increased 
indefinitely without deterring beyond the optimal level.38 
Since this approach permits the imposition of penalties that are 
larger than the multiplier principle (rather than penalties that are 
smaller, as under most of the other alternatives discussed here), it 
36. See Cooter, supra note 9, passim. By contrast, penalties calculated according to the 
multiplier principle are referred to by Cooter as "prices," because they achieve deterrence by 
making defendants pay the full social costs of their behavior (no more, and no less) as the 
"price" of that behavior. See id. at 1528. 
37. Compare Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 905·08 (arguing that the reprehensibil· 
ity of the defendant's conduct should be irrelevant when damages are calculated by the mul· 
tiplier principle, because under the multiplier principle the only relevant factors are the 
amount of the harm and the probability of punishment). 
38. See Cooter, supra note 9, at 1524-27. 
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raises distinct issues that I will not address further.39 Still, the possi­
bility of optimal deterrence with even larger penalties does rein­
force the general lesson of this article - i.e., that the multiplier 
principle is sufficient but not necessary for optimal deterrence. 
D. Caps on Damages, and Other Possible Adjustments 
Finally, optimal deterrence can also be achieved by leaving the 
substantive standard unchanged, but starting with compensatory 
damages and adding or subtracting (rather than multiplying) a con­
stant amount to each award. The size of the optimal addition or 
subtraction is harder to express mathematically,40 but its general 
character depends on the same factors that characterize the optimal 
constant multiplier. That is, whenever the optimal constant multi­
plier would be greater than one (implying that compensatory dam­
ages need to be increased), optimal deterrence can be achieved by 
adding some amount to each compensatory award. Similarly, 
whenever the optimal constant multiplier would be less than one, 
optimal deterrence can be achieved by subtracting some amount 
from each compensatory award. Either way, the size of the amount 
to be added or subtracted will be greater or less depending on just 
how much the optimal constant multiplier would have been greater 
or lesser than one. 
For a similar reason, optimal deterrence could also be achieved 
by placing a cap on the maximum size of the award - a move that 
several states have enacted or considered in recent years.41 Placing 
a cap on the largest possible award is similar in many respects to 
subtracting something from the expected value of the damage 
award. That is, if defendants face uncertainty about how damages 
will be measured (in addition to uncertainty about whether they 
will be liable at all), an upper limit on the maximum possible award 
will cut off the upper end of that distribution. This will reduce the 
average award, thereby reducing the deterrent effect. 
To be sure, these reductions would make little sense if optimal 
deterrence were being pursued by means of the traditional multi­
plier principle. Under the traditional multiplier principle, we must 
be prepared to increase damage awards to almost any level, espe-
39. For further discussions of this approach as it might apply to punitive damages, see 
Hylton, supra note 1; and Johnston, Punitive Liability, supra note 35. 
40. For a mathematical model, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Welfare 
Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 159-60, 163 
app. {1988). 
41. For citations to the various legislative proposals, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 app. (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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cially when the probability of punishment is relatively small (so that 
the optimal case-by-case multiplier is large). As Polinsky and 
Shaven have recently argued, caps on the largest possible award 
could interfere with this goal, leading to less than optimal 
deterrence. 42 
If optimal deterrence is instead being pursued by some other 
route, however, it is harder to condemn such caps a priori. For ex­
ample, if the law instead aims to achieve optimal deterrence by ap­
proximating the optimal constant multiplier, we have already seen 
that this typically requires awards that are lower than those called 
for by the traditional multiplier principle.43 Viewed with this goal 
in mind, a cap on the highest possible awards could be seen as mov­
ing the average or expected award in just the right direction. In 
other words, a reform that seems obviously unsound from the 
standpoint of one route to optimal deterrence could be perfectly 
sound from the standpoint of another. 
Of course, to say that caps on damage awards could be justified 
is not to say that any particular proposal is a good idea. Calculating 
the exact size of the optimal adjustment will often be difficult, in 
which case it may be hard to say whether any particular cap goes 
too far or not far enough. Indeed, calculation problems arise under 
each of the alternatives - as, of course, they arise to some extent 
under the multiplier principle itself. These calculation problems, 
and other issues surrounding the administration of each set of rem­
edies, will be discussed below in Part IV. 
For now, my point is simply that the existence of alternative 
routes must first be recognized before we can even begin to con­
sider which is easiest to calculate, or which is best on any other 
grounds. If we instead assume that the traditional multiplier repre­
sents the only means of achieving optimal deterrence - as much of 
the legal literature implicitly assumes today - we will never reach 
the question of which route is on balance superior, because only 
one route will even be considered. This accounts for my goal in the 
first two parts of this article: to show that the multiplier principle is 
sufficient, but not necessary, for optimal deterrence. 
Ill. THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE EXPECTED PUNISHMENT 
Part IV will discuss the actual advantages and disadvantages of 
the alternative routes to optimal deterrence. Before beginning that 
42. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 900. 
43. See supra section II.A. 
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discussion, though, this Part will say more about just when (and 
why) the expected punishment might respond to changes in a de­
fendant's behavior. As we have already seen, the rate at which the 
probability of punishment declines is a key factor in determining 
just how much lower a constant multiplier or a constant fine should 
be to achieve optimal deterrence. Thus, the responsiveness of the 
probability of punishment will play a key role in the comparisons in 
Part IV of this article. 
To see how the expected punishment responds to changes in a 
defendant's behavior, it will be helpful to isolate several compo­
nents. Before a defendant can be punished, several events must 
occur: (a) the defendant's offense must be detected by someone; 
(b) a plaintiff, or a government prosecutor, must decide to file suit; 
(c) the court, or some other adjudicative body, must find the de­
fendant liable; and ( d) the appropriate fine or measure of damages 
must be assessed. Since all four events must occur before the de­
fendant will be punished, the expected penalty depends on the com­
bined probability of all four - that is, on the probability of 
detection times the probability of prosecution times the probability 
of a finding of liability times the expected fine or damage award. 
Each of these component probabilities will be discussed below. 
A. The Probability of Detection 
In some contexts, the probability of detecting any given offense 
will be completely unresponsive to the defendant's behavior. For 
example, whether a speeding violation is detected typically depends 
entirely on whether a police officer is present. Moreover, the 
probability of a police officer being present is normally unaffected 
by how fast the driver drives, and thus is unresponsive to any im­
provement in the driver's behavior. In such a case, where the 
probability of punishment depends only on the probability the 
offense is detected, that probability will not respond to any im­
provements in a defendant's behavior.44 
In some cases, though, even the probability of detection may 
respond to the seriousness of the defendant's behavior. For exam­
ple, if it is easy to detect that toxic waste has been leaked but hard 
to detect who was responsible for the leak, the investigating author­
ities may spend more time tracking down large leaks than tracking 
44. Interestingly, many analyses of the traditional multiplier principle assumed the only 
reason for imperfect enforcement was a low probability of detection. This is clearly true of 
the earliest writers such as Beccaria and Bentham, cited supra in note 1. It is also true of 
most of the examples in the recent article by Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3. 
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down small ones. If so, then manufacturers who permit the risk of 
large leaks will effectively face a higher probability of detection 
than will manufacturers who take more precautions and whose 
leaks are likely to be small.45 In that event, even the probability of 
detection will respond to changes in a defendant's behavior. 
More important, even when the probability of detection is unre­
sponsive to the defendant's behavior, the final probability of pun­
ishment will also depend on the probability of prosecution and 
conviction. As the following subsections demonstrate, these 
probabilities are almost always responsive to changes in a defend­
ant's behavior. 
B .  The Probability of Litigation 
1 .  The Probability of Prosecution in Systems of 
Public Enforcement 
Public prosecutors have limited resources, so the probability 
that a detected offense will be prosecuted is typically less than 
100%. While this will reduce the law's deterrent effect, the impor­
tant point (for present purposes) is that the lower probability will 
not normally be the same for all defendants, and thus will not be a 
constant. Prosecutors usually have discretion to decide which cases 
they pursue, and they often try to concentrate their limited 
prosecutorial resources on the most serious offenses. If so, defend­
ants who improve their behavior will be rewarded with a lower 
probability of prosecution. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine systems of public prosecution in 
which this is not true. Police officers, for example, are more likely 
to stop a speeder who is thirty miles per hour over the speed limit 
than one who is only five miles per hour over; and pollution author­
ities are more likely to seek penalties for a huge leak of toxic waste 
than they are for a small one. Some of this responsiveness may be 
because it will be easier to win a case against the larger offender 
than against the marginal one, thus implicating the probability of 
success at trial (to be discussed in the following subsection). But 
even if conviction were certain, one would still expect prosecutors 
to devote the most resources to prosecuting those defendants 
45. On the other hand, manufacturers who permit large leaks (or commit other serious 
offenses) may also take greater pains to try to conceal their offense, thereby reducing the 
probability of punishment. For a formal model of this effect - but one assuming that the 
probability of punishment does not also vary with the egregiousness of the defendant's 
behavior, and considering deterrence only by means of a constant fine - see Arnn S. Malik, 
Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RANo J. EcoN. 341 (1990). 
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whose violations were the most serious. In any system of public 
enforcement, then, we should expect the probability of prosecution 
to decline with improvements in a defendant's behavior. The exact 
rate of the decline will depend on the extent of the prosecutorial 
discretion, and on the political and other factors that influence how 
that discretion is exercised.46 
2. The Probability of Litigation Under Private Enforcement 
If enforcement instead depends on private lawsuits, there may 
be no public-spirited reasons for plaintiffs to concentrate their ef­
forts on the most serious offenses. There may, however, be private 
motives for them to do so. In particular, if the most serious offenses 
are also the ones that cause the most damage to their victims, then 
the victims of the most serious offenses will expect the largest dam­
age awards. All else equal, then, victims of the most serious 
offenses will also be the ones most likely to find it worthwhile to 
hire a lawyer and sue. If so, then the most serious offenders will 
again face the highest probability of suit.47 
Of course, some kinds of improvements may not have this ef­
fect, if they reduce the probability of an accident but do not alter 
the injury that results if an accident occurs.48 In that event, since 
the improvements will not affect the amount that is likely to be re­
coverable at trial, they also will not affect the probability of litiga­
tion. In many cases, though, extra precautions will reduce the 
injury likely to be caused by an accident, and thus will also reduce 
the amount likely to be recoverable at trial. For example, driving at 
a lower speed typically reduces the magnitude of any injuries likely 
to be suffered, as well as reducing the likelihood of any accident at 
all. Similarly, improvements in a manufacturer's system of quality 
control often will reduce the average severity of any defects that 
happen to slip through the system, as well as reducing the likeli­
hood of any defect at all. Whenever improvements in a defendant's 
46. This suggests that a fruitful line of research might investigate the extent to which, 
under different systems of punishments, it would be optimal for prosecutors to try to make 
the probability of litigation more or less responsive to changes in a defendant's behavior. I 
am grateful to Howard Chang for this suggestion. 
47. For a mathematical model of just such a system, see Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 
40. Tue same argument is also made in A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really 
Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
663, 675-76 (1997). 
48. For a mathematical model employing this alternative assumption, see Keith N. 
Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under 
Negligence, 10 INn.. REv. L. & EcoN. 161 (1991). 
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care do reduce the damages victims will suffer, they should also re­
duce the probability that any victim will bother to sue. 
I should note that, when extra precautions do reduce the 
probability that a victim will sue, there is an additional reason why 
optimal penalties could depart from the traditional multiplier prin­
ciple. My analysis so far has interpreted the socially efficient level 
of precautions as the level that minimizes the total accident costs 
plus the total cost of precautions. However, if litigation is costly 
then it may be more plausible to define the efficient level of precau­
tions as the level that minimizes the sum of accident costs, precau­
tion costs, and litigation costs.49 If so, reducing the size of the 
penalty may produce additional benefits by reducing the number of 
suits that are filed, thus reducing total litigation costs. On the other 
hand, if the reduced penalty led to fewer precautions and hence a 
larger number of accidents, then the total number of suits might 
actually rise (even if the probability that any given accident would 
lead to a suit had declined). As a result, it is hard to say which way 
penalties should be adjusted to optimize the effect on the total 
amount of litigation.so 
Nevertheless, even if the effect on the absolute level of litigation 
is indeterminate, it remains true that the probability of litigation 
facing any individual defendant will usually be somewhat respon­
sive to that defendant's behavior. This is enough to give rise to all 
of the effects analyzed in earlier sections of this article. That is, if 
the probability of litigation is itself responsive to defendants' 
behavior, then the overall probability of punishment will also be 
responsive, because the probability of litigation is simply one com­
ponent of the overall probability of punishment. And if the overall 
probability of punishment is responsive to defendants' behavior, 
then the optimal constant multiplier will again diverge from the op­
timal case-by-case multiplier, and each of these will diverge from 
the optimal fine (or the optimal adjustment in any substantive legal 
standard). In other words, if the probability of litigation responds 
to improvements in a defendant's behavior, satisfaction of the mul-
49. This is the goal assumed in id. at 164; and by Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40. 
For a discussion of these (and other) goals more generally, see Gumo CALABRESI, THE CosT 
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-33 (1970). 
50. As Polinsky and Rubinfeld conclude, "(t]he optimal adjustment to compensatory 
damages takes both of these considerations into account, and may be positive or negative." 
Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 153. For a qualitatively similar analysis, see David D. 
Friedman, An Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1125, 1133-34 
(1989). 
Litigation costs could also rise if the amount spent on each suit increased, even if the total 
number of suits did not. This possibility will be discussed infra in section IV.F. 
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tiplier principle will again be sufficient but not necessary for opti­
mal deterrence. 
C. The Probability of Conviction 
The effects just discussed will be even more pronounced if im­
provements in a defendant's behavior also affect the probability of 
an adverse decision in any case in which a lawsuit has been filed. 
For simplicity, I will refer to this as "the probability of conviction," 
though I intend it to include unfavorable decisions in both public 
prosecutions and private damage actions (where "probability of a 
finding of liability" would be a more appropriate but more cumber­
some label). As the probability of conviction depends largely on 
the underlying legal standard, I discuss legal regimes based on strict 
liability separately from those based on negligence. 
1. The Probability of Conviction Under Strict Liability 
If the legal regime is truly one of strict liability, the probability 
of conviction may be unresponsive to a defendant's behavior. The 
probability of conviction may not be 100%, for even regimes of 
"strict liability" usually require proof of certain elements (was the 
defendant engaged in the activity? did that activity cause this plain­
tiff's harm?), and the chance of judicial error on one of these ele­
ments may leave defendants facing a probability of punishment 
below 100%. Still, as long as the chance of error is not correlated 
with the defendant's level of care, or with the social desirability of 
any other dimension of the defendant's behavior, the probability of 
conviction will still be unresponsive to any improvements in the de­
fendant's behavior.51 If so, then any responsiveness in the overall 
probability of punishment will have to come from other compo­
nents of that probability, such as the probability of detection or the 
probability of litigation. 
2. The Probability of Conviction Under Negligence 
If the legal regime is based on negligence, though, a different 
picture emerges. A "negligence" regime, as I use that term, is one 
that conditions liability on whether the defendant conformed to 
some legally determined standard of behavior. Under such a re­
gime, the probability of conviction should be extremely responsive 
to improvements in a defendant's behavior. 
51. Some reasons why this probability might indeed be correlated with the social desira­
bility of the defendant's behavior will be discussed infra in subsection III.D. 
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Indeed, the standard economic analysis of negligence rules has 
already recognized many of the points made in this article.52 The 
earliest analyses focused on perfectly applied negligence rules, in 
which defendants' liability depended solely on whether they had 
complied with the legal standard of care. This meant that the 
probability of punishment declined instantly and dramatically, from 
100% all the way to 0%, as soon as defendants came into compli­
ance with the legal standard. A perfectly functioning negligence re­
gime is thus the most extreme case of the phenomenon of interest 
here, for it yields a probability of punishment that is extremely re­
sponsive to improvements in a defendant's behavior. 
Significantly, analyses of perfect negligence standards have long 
recognized that the expected measure of damages (if and when lia­
bility is found) need not satisfy the traditional multiplier principle.53 
To the contrary, if the probability of punishment falls instantane­
ously to zero, there will usually be a broad range of fines or damage 
awards that will suffice to induce compliance with the legal stan­
dard. Because defendants who comply with such a standard are re­
warded by having their liability eliminated entirely, they will have 
an incentive to do so as long as the penalty (if they do not comply) 
equals or exceeds the cost of complying, so any penalty at or above 
that level should lead to optimal deterrence. 54 In other words, 
under a perfect negligence standard, satisfaction of the multiplier 
principle clearly is sufficient but not necessary for optimal 
deterrence. 
Of course, most real-world negligence standards are not perfect, 
and compliance with the standard will not change the probability of 
conviction from 100% to zero. More realistically, even defendants 
who comply with the standard might still be held liable through 
legal error, though that risk will normally decline as they take more 
care (i.e., as they take precautions well in excess of the legal stan­
dard).55 On the other side of the line, even defendants who do not 
comply will sometimes be exonerated through judicial error, though 
52. For a nontechnical discussion, see Cooter, supra note 9, at 1526-27, 1538-39. 
53. See, e.g., id. 
54. See id. Of course, compliance with the legal standard will produce socially optimal 
deterrence only if the legal standard is set at the socially efficient level of care. 
55. Note that if there were no error or uncertainty of this sort, then defendants would 
always comply with the negligence standard and would never be found liable, so it would 
never be worthwhile for plaintiffs to bring suit. In other words, a negligence system with 
perfect compliance and no uncertainty or error is not a sustainable equilibrium. For mathe­
matical analyses of this aspect of a negligence system, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation 
and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 433 (1990); Janusz A. Ordover, 
Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL Sruo. 243 (1978). 
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this possibility will typically decline as they take .less care (i.e., as 
they fall obviously short of the legal standard). In other words, 
under most real-world negligence standards, defendants face a con­
tinuously declining probability of conviction that varies with the 
amount of care they actually take. 
This continuously declining probability of punishment is pre­
cisely what I have assumed throughout the body of this article. 
That is, in this sort of regime defendants who improve their level of 
precautions will see their probability of conviction fall from 25% to 
20%, or 10%, or some other lower figure (depending on the rate of 
legal error). Under such a regime, there will no longer be an entire 
range of punishments that induce compliance with the optimal stan­
dard of care, as there would have been under a perfect negligence 
system. Instead, as we have already seen, there will only be one 
constant multiplier that will create the optimal incentives, just as 
there will only be one constant fine that is optimal (and only one 
optimal case-by-case multiplier). And since the optimal case-by­
case multiplier will then diverge from the optimal constant multi­
plier (as well as from the optimal constant fine), there will again be 
more than one route to optimal deterrence. 
It is important to remember, too, that "negligence" as it is used 
here is a term of art that covers more than its usual legal meaning. 
That is, in economic analyses of law, "negligence" is used to refer to 
any regime in which defendants are legally liable for the harm they 
cause if, but only if, some aspect of their behavior is judged by a 
court to fall short of some socially desirable ievel.56 This term is 
usually used to mark a contrast with regimes of "strict liability" (an­
other term of art) in which defendants are legally liable without 
regard to the social desirability of any dimension of their behavior, 
so the probability of conviction is truly unresponsive to improve­
ments in a defendant's behavior. 
Under these definitions, many bodies of law - probably most 
- are "negligence" regimes. For example, many pollution laws 
hold defendants liable if (but only if) their pollution exceeds a le­
gally permitted level.57 Similarly, the law of predatory pricing pro­
hibits monopolists from cutting prices under certain circumstances, 
if (but only if) the new prices fall below a legally permitted level.58 
' 56. For a rigorous mathematical definition, see SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 8. 
57. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 425-71 (1998) (EPA effluent guidelines and standards under 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (penalties for violation of 
same). 
58. For an overview of the relevant legal standards, see Michael L. Denger & John A. 
Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 ANrrrRuST L.J. 541 (1994). 
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And the law of fraud holds defendants liable if (but only if) the 
allegedly fraudulent statements would have been interpreted by a 
"reasonable" listener as asserting a false claim, where the judge or 
jury must decide whether any given statement violates that stan­
dard (or whether the statement should instead have been dis­
counted as mere "puffing").59 This makes each of these doctrines a 
"negligence" regime, according to the economic definition of that 
term. 
Indeed, even legal doctrines described by courts as "strict liabil­
ity" are sometimes negligence regimes for purposes of this defini­
tion. For example, it is often said that manufacturers are "strictly" 
liable for all defects that leave their products in an unreasonably 
dangerous state. When the alleged defect consists of a dangerous 
design, however, the court must decide whether the design was so 
bad as to produce an unreasonably dangerous product, and the 
manufacturer will be legally liable if (but only if) the product's de­
sign falls short of the standard adopted by the court.60 This makes 
the regime one of "negligence" rather than "strict liability" (accord­
ing to the economic definition), for the defendant's liability de­
pends on the social desirability of its product design choices. By 
contrast, in strict liability regimes the defendant's liability may de­
pend on how it behaved, but not on the social desirability of its 
behavior.61 
My purpose here is not to quibble with the economic defini­
tions, which do serve a useful analytic purpose. Instead, my point is 
simply that under the vast majority of legal standards - whatever 
59. When a fraud claim rests on the defendant's failure to disclose information ade­
quately, the court must also decide whether the undisclosed information would have been 
"material" to a reasonable listener - in other words, whether the defendant's behavior went 
far enough in disclosing all the information that might have been disclosed. Fleming James, 
Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation (pt. 2), 37 Mo. L. REv. 488, 497-502 (1978). The 
analogous issues raised in public prosecutions for false advertising are discussed in Richard 
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 679·81, 696-714 (1985). 
60. The same is true if the manufacturer's liability rests on an alleged failure to provide 
users with an adequate warning of the product's risks (thus raising disclosure issues similar to 
those raised by some claims of "fraud," discussed supra in note 59). For more complete 
discussions of the relationship between "strict liability" and "negligence" in the products 
liability context see, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From 
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. REv. 593 (1980); David 
G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 743. 
61. For example, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities (such as dynamiting) attaches 
only to defendants who engage in that activity, so even this liability is conditional on how the 
defendant behaved. However, it is not conditional on any judgment about the social desira­
bility of the relevant behavior - for example, there is no scrutiny of the desirability of a 
defendant's decision to engage in dynamiting. This is what makes liability for ultrahazardous 
activities a regime of "strict liability" even under the economic definition. 
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label we use to characterize them - the probability of conviction 
will be highly responsive to changes in a defendant's behavior. 
Companies whose products impose only slight dangers, or dangers 
only slightly in excess of their acknowledged benefits, are surely 
more likely to escape liability than are manufacturers whose prod­
ucts impose greater dangers. Similarly, sellers who disclose all of 
the most important facts, and omit only a few arguably relevant 
ones, are more likely to escape liability than are those who disclose 
nothing whatsoever, omitting even those facts whose importance is 
obvious. In short, these are all regimes in which the probability of a 
conviction changes with improvements in a defendant's behavior, 
and this is enough to generate the effects discussed earlier in this 
article. (Of course, if the probability of detection and/or the 
probability of filing suit are also responsive to changes in a defend­
ants' behavior, these same effects will be present even in regimes of 
true strict liability.) 
D. The Probability of Different Damage Awards 
Finally, the legal doctrines governing the measurement of dam­
ages can produce similar effects. Moreover, these effects may be 
present whether the regime is based on negligence or on strict lia­
bility. True, the measurement of damages will be irrelevant in any 
system employing a constant fine, where (by definition) the penalty 
does not depend on the damages in any particular case. Whenever 
the penalty does depend on the damages in each case, however, the 
rules for measuring damages can alter the deterrent effect. 
The most relevant doctrines here are those that exclude certain 
elements from the legally recoverable damages. Sometimes losses 
are excluded if they were not reasonably foreseeable to the defend­
ant, 62 or if their amount could not be proven with an acceptable 
degree of precision.63 Sometimes whole categories of losses may be 
excluded, as with economic losses in some tort cases,64 or damages 
for mental suffering and emotional distress in most breaches of con­
tract. 65 In still other cases, if the defendant's behavior contributed 
to the victim's harm in only a probabilistic way (by increasing the 
62. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Hadley v. Baxendale, 
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
63. See 4 FmVLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTS § 25.3 (2d ed. 1986). 
64. See 4 id. § 25.18a. 
65. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979). 
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risk of an injury), recovery may be disallowed under the rules gov­
erning causation. 66 
Insofar as these exclusions reduce defendants' expected liability, 
they will reduce the deterrent effect. Indeed, the need to make up 
for such exclusions from "compensatory" damages has itself been 
cited as one possible rationale for punitive awards.67 What is less 
often noted, however, is that these exclusionary doctrines are often 
applied in a way that makes them highly responsive to changes in a 
defendant's underlying behavior. And this responsiveness creates 
an offsetting effect that increases the law's deterrent effect, for all of 
the reasons discussed earlier in this article. 
For example, in cases where the defendant's conduct merely in­
creased the risk of a probabilistic injury, it is often said that a de­
fendant will be liable only if it is "more likely than not" that the 
defendant's negligence actually caused the plaintiff's injury. In eco­
nomic analyses, it is sometimes assumed that this rule makes de­
fendants liable if their negligence increased the probability of an 
injury by more than 50%.68 If such a 50% cutoff could be applied 
perfectly, then defendants' expected liability would drop instanta­
neously to zero once their behavior improved to the point where 
their contribution to the risk fell below that threshold. In other 
words, a perfectly applied 50% rule would produce effects very sim­
ilar to those of the perfectly applied negligence standard discussed 
earlier.69 But if there is instead any uncertainty in the application 
of the 50% cutoff - for example, if defendants cannot know in 
advance precisely how much of the probability a judge or jury will 
ascribe to their particular behavior - then the expected punish­
ment will fall more gradually, as defendants who improve their 
behavior face an increasing likelihood that their behavior will be 
66. See 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 20.2, at 93-101, 107-10. For economic analyses 
of this rule, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Eco­
nomic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Rosenberg, supra note 30; Steven Shavell, 
Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 587 
(1985). 
67. See, e.g., Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 768-69; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., 
Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 39 
(1990); see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 896 ("To the extent that [certain losses 
are excluded from compensatory damages], an argument can be made that the level of dam­
ages should be higher than that called for by our multiplier formula . . . .  " (emphasis added)). 
Polinsky and Shaven ultimately reco=end that these excluded losses not be used to justify 
punitive awards, but only because the cost of measuring them will often be too high, and 
because (when the cost is not too high) a superior solution would be to revise the rules so 
that those losses were no longer excluded. See id. at 939-41. 
68. See, e.g., Shaven, supra note 66, at 588. 
69. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
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found to fall below the relevant cutoff.70 In other words, defend­
ants who improve their behavior are more likely to be exonerated 
on causal grounds from full responsibility for all of the losses they 
may have caused. 
More generally, defendants who improve their behavior may 
also be more likely to receive the benefit of the doubt under most 
of the other doctrines governing the measurement of da mages. In 
some cases, the categorical exclusion of certain kinds of damages 
may be relaxed against defendants who behaved in a particularly 
egregious way.71 In other cases, the responsiveness may come less 
from an explicit legal rule and more from biases in the application 
of a vague legal standard, such as the requirement that losses be 
proven with reasonable certainty,72 or that the losses have been rea­
sonably foreseeable to the defendant.73 D efendants who behaved 
well may be more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from the 
judge (or jury) in these matters, while defendants who behaved 
badly may be treated more harshly.74 
The reason this is important, of course, is that if a limit on the 
recoverability of damages is applied in a way that itself responds to 
changes in a defendant's behavior, this will increase the law's deter­
rent effect. That is, even if the absolute level of damages is still less 
than the harm caused by the violation (because some losses are still 
being excluded from the measure of damages) , there can still be an 
70. For cases suggesting that the actual rule is applied quite flexibly, see 4 HARPER ET 
AL., supra note 63, § 20.2, at 93-101. 
71. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972) (damages for emo­
tional distress not normally recoverable for breach of contract, but held recoverable in tort if 
the defendant breached "in a wanton or reckless manner"), overruled by Francis v. Lee 
Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1999). For discussions of other similar doctrines, see 
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994); and 
Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Con­
tract, 24 Aruz. L. REv. 733 (1982). 
72. Harper, James, and Gray note an increasing liberality in allowing plaintiffs to recover 
without proving their loss with literal certainty. They also report that "the tendency is great­
est where the nature and impact of defendant's act is such as to make likely the kind of harm 
that plaintiff is claiming, or to be especially offensive in light of public policy considerations." 
4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 25.3, at 510 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
73. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 
(pt. 1), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 85 (1936) ("As in the case of all 'reasonable man' standards, there is 
an element of circularity about the test of foreseeability. 'For what items of damages should 
the court hold the defaulting promisor? Those which he should as a reasonable man have 
foreseen. But what should he have foreseen as a reasonable man? Those items of damages 
for which the court feels he ought to pay."'). 
74. This aspect of legal bias was often noted by the legal realists. See, e.g., Ralph S. 
Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586 
(1933); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 73, at 77. For more recent evidence consistent with this 
view, see Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects 
of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 297, 334-35. 
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increased marginal incentive if the damages respond sufficiently to 
changes in a defendant's behavior. Here, too, it is the rate of 
change in the expected liability, rather than the absolute level of 
liability, that matters for deterrence. 
An example will serve to illustrate. In the toxic waste scenario, 
we originally assumed that each leak would cause $6 million in 
damages if no extra precautions were taken, and $5 million if the 
precautions were taken. Suppose now that many of these damages 
are difficult to measure, or are difficult to attribute to any particular 
defendant. But suppose, too, that more of these losses will be at­
tributed to defendants who did not take any extra precautions than 
to defendants who did take precautions, simply because the former 
are less likely to get the benefit of any doubt. For concreteness, 
suppose that defendants who did not take the precautions will be 
assessed $5 million in damages each time they are caught (as com­
pared to the $6 million in damages their activity actually caused), 
while defendants who did take precautions will be charged with 
only $1 million in damages (as compared to the $5 million they ac­
tually caused). In other words, suppose that both types of defend­
ants get away with paying less than the full social costs of their 
behavior, but that this shortfall is greatest for defendants who took 
the extra precautions. 
In such a case, even if the probability of punishment is 25% for 
both defendants (and thus is completely unresponsive to changes in 
their behavior), defendants will still have an incentive to take the 
optimal level of care. It might seem as though their incentives in 
this case would have to favor underdeterrence, since neither de­
fendant is being charged with the full social costs of its behavior, 
and since both defendants are discounting these already-low penal­
ties by the same 25% probability of punishment. However, in this 
example defendants who do not take the extra precautions will face 
an expected liability of $12,500 (.01 x .25 x $5,000,000), while de­
fendants who do take the precautions will see their expected liabil­
ity fall to $2,500 (.01 x .25 x $1,000,000). This means that the 
precautions can save defendants $10,000 in expected liability 
($12,500 - $2,500),  which just equals the social value of the precau­
tions and thus achieves optimal deterrence. 
The lesson here is the same as it was in preceding subsections of 
this article. That is, it is not simply the absolute level of expected 
liability that matters, but rather the rate at which that expected lia­
bility declines with improvements in a defendant's behavior. It will 
be relatively rare for that decline to come from changes in the mere 
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probability of detection, but it should be quite common - the rule, 
rather than the exception - for improvements in a defendant's 
behavior to reduce the probability of prosecution, the probability of 
conviction, and/or the likely damage award. Declines in any of 
these factors will cause a divergence between the optimal 
case-by-case multiplier and the optimal constant multiplier (or the 
optimal constant fine). As a result, satisfaction of the traditional 
multiplier principle will be sufficient but not necessary for optimal 
deterrence - and this conclusion, too, should be considered the 
rule rather than the exception. 
IV. CHOOSING AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES 
We are now in a position to compare the strengths and weak­
nesses of case-by-case multipliers, constant multipliers, and the 
other alternative penalty systems discussed above. While any of 
these systems could, in theory, lead to optimal levels of deterrence, 
they differ in many other respects that could make them more or 
less desirable. In this final Part of the article, I consider differences 
based on their relative ease of administration; their effect on other 
economically relevant variables, such as the level of overall activity 
or the optimal allocation of risk; and their possible symbolic or ex­
pressive effects. 
A. Ease of Calculation 
One virtue of the traditional multiplier principle is that it is con­
ceptually simple and, therefore, easy to explain to a judge or jury. 
The case-by-case multiplier requires only two pieces of information: 
the actual harm caused by the defendant's behavior, and the actual 
probability of punishment that the defendant faced. And while it 
will rarely be possible to measure either of these elements precisely, 
in many cases it should be possible to come to a rough estimate.75 
Moreover, all that really matters under this approach is that the 
average or expected penalty equal the actual harm divided by the 
probability of punishment, so it may not even matter if juries err as 
long as their errors are not systematically biased in either 
direction.76 
By contrast, many of the alternative remedies are more difficult 
to calculate. For example, to determine the optimal constant multi-
75. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 891-93. For somewhat more skeptical views, 
based on the psychology of jury decision-making, see Sunstein et al., supra note 4, at 2111-12; 
Viscusi, supra note 4, at 327-32. 
76. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 892. 
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plier, the decisionmaker must know several factors in addition to 
the actual harm caused by the defendant's behavior and the actual 
probability of punishment. In addition, the decisionmaker must be 
able to estimate the actual harm that would have been present, and 
the probability of punishment the defendant would have faced, if 
the defendant had instead committed a slightly more or slightly less 
serious violation. In particular, the decisionmaker must be able to 
measure each set of factors with sufficient precision to estimate the 
difference between the two violations, in order to calculate the rate 
of change in the relevant variables. Finally, once these estimates 
have been made, they must then be combined through a formula 
that is more complicated than simply multiplying by one over the 
probability of punishment.77 Thus, the optimal constant multiplier 
will always be harder to calculate than the optimal case-by-case 
multiplier. 
The same objection can be raised against many of the other al­
ternatives discussed above. For e�ample, calculating the optimal 
constant to add or subtract from a compensatory award, or the opti­
mal amount by which to adjust the substantive legal standard, is just 
as complex as calculating the optimal constant multiplier.78 Calcu­
lating the optimal constant fine is slightly simpler conceptually, for 
this requires knowledge of only (a) the rate at which the probability 
of punishment changes in response to changes in defendants' 
behavior, and (b) the rate at which the expected social costs change 
in response to changes in defendants' behavior.79 But information 
about these hypothetical rates of change will often be hard to come 
by, compared to information about the actual social harm and the 
actual probability of punishment. As a result, the case-by-case mul­
tiplier will surely rank highest in ease of calculation. 
77. If x represents the defendant's level of precautions, H(x) represents the expected 
social harm at any particular level of precautions, and P(x) represents the probability of 
punishment at any particular level of precautions, then the optimal case-by-case multiplier is 
given by a simple fraction: 1/P(x). To calculate the optimal constant multiplier, we need to 
let x* represent the socially optimal level of precautions, and H'(x*) and P'(x*) represent the 
rate at which the social harm and the probability of punishment change with slight deviations 
from the optimal level of precautions. The optimal constant multiplier can then be written as 
the following complex formula: 
H'(x*) 
H'(x*) P(x*) + H(x*) P'(x*) 
See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 294. Obviously, this complex formula would be 
more difficult to present to a judge or jury. 
78. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 159-60, app. 
79. Using the notation introduced supra in note 77, the optimal constant fine can be rep­
resented by the simple fraction H'(x*)IP'(x*). See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 297. 
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B. Institutional Responsibility 
Another difference is that a case-by-case multiplier, by its very 
nature, must be calculated separately for each defendant, so all the 
calculations must be made by a judge or jury. By contrast, a con­
stant multiplier could be set once by a legislature or administrative 
agency, leaving judges and juries with only the task (in each individ­
ual case) of measuring the losses to which the constant multiplier 
would be applied. If a constant fine were used, the judge or jury 
would not even need to calculate the actual losses in each case, thus 
shifting even more of the work to a centralized body. 
The ability to make such calculations centrally could be an ad­
vantage. Obviously, it is sometimes cheaper to have calculations 
made once by a centralized body, rather than making them anew in 
every case. A centralized body may also be able to assemble more 
expertise than a judge or a jury - for example, it could commission 
statistical studies of the probability of punishment and the rate at 
which it changes. A centralized body can also benefit from the abil­
ity to "fine tune" a constant multiplier or a constant fine (or an 
adjustment to the substantive legal standard), raising or lowering it 
until the desired level of deterrence is achieved. Finally, in some 
contexts (or from some perspectives) a centralized body might be 
seen as more "democratic" or politically accountable. 
On the other hand, there are also drawbacks to a centralized 
decision process, which may make these advantages moot. A cen­
tralized body may be more prone to political "capture" by groups 
favorable to plaintiffs or defendants.80 Also, even a well-motivated 
central body must face the practical problem of defining, in ad­
vance, the exact class of cases to which any particular fine or multi­
plier would be applied. After all, the constant multiplier that is 
optimal for malpractice cases is unlikely to be the safi?.e as the one 
that is optimal for products liability cases; it may also be different 
for some malpractice cases than for others. Thus, any centralized 
solution must either (a) define a separate penalty for many differ­
ent categories of cases, with the attendant difficulty of defining the 
boundaries of each; or (b) rely on a smaller number of relatively 
crude categories, recognizing that the penalty selected for each 
category will not be ideal for every case within that category. 
By contrast, one advantage of a decentralized system is that it is 
unnecessary to define such categories in advance. As Polinsky and 
80. Tue legislatively enacted caps on punitive damage awards, discussed supra in the text 
following note 41, may be an example of this. 
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Shaven pointed out in their analysis of the case-by-case multiplier, 
courts can estimate the probability of punishment facing any partic­
u1ar defendant without having to assign that defendant to some a 
priori category: they can define that probability based on whatever 
is known about this individual defendant's characteristics.81 To be 
sure, this does not mean that judges or juries will necessarily get the 
probability right, for (as the preceding subsection discussed) even 
case-by-case calcu1ations cannot be based on anything more than a 
rough estimate of the relevant variables. But since judges and ju­
ries decide cases after the fact, they will at least be spared the cost 
of trying to define relevant categories in advance, which is an una­
voidable cost of any centralized calcu1ation. 
In short, there may be cases where the appropriate penalty can 
best be calcu1ated centrally, and in those cases the traditional 
case-by-case mu1tiplier will be inferior (insofar as ease of calcula­
tion is concerned). In many cases, though, the costs of centraliza­
tion will be too high, so both the case-by-case multiplier and the 
possible alternatives will have to be estimated in every case by indi­
vidual judges or juries. In that event, the advantage in terms of 
ease of calcu1ation will usually rest with the traditional case-by-case 
mu1tiplier, for the reasons discussed in the preceding subsection. 
C. Optimal Levels of Activity 
In addition, whenever it is important to optimize defendants' 
levels of activity, the case-by-case mu1tiplier may well be superior. 
As Steven Shaven first emphasized, many social costs can be re­
duced by carrying on an activity more carefully or by reducing the 
frequency of the activity itself.82 For example, drivers can reduce 
the number of auto accidents by driving more carefully, but they 
can also reduce the number of accidents by using their cars less fre-
81. See Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 893. More precisely, the probability can be 
estimated based on (1) all facts that were known to the defendant at the time it chose its level 
of care, together with (2) any other facts that did not become known until later, but only if 
those facts were just as likely to raise the probability as to lower it. The qualification is 
important because it would not be correct, under the traditional multiplier principle, to calcu­
late the probability of punishment for a narrow category defined as "all defendants who 
behaved in the following way and who happened to leave evidence that allowed their victim 
to bring suit and prevail at trial." The probability of punishment for defendants who are 
defined in this way is, of course, exactly one, so calculating the multiplier on this basis would 
be the same as employing no multiplier at all. 
For a more general discussion of the choice between categorical and individualized judg­
ments, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 
{1992). 
82. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 2-3 (1980). 
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quently. Thus, optimizing the level of activity can also be a legiti­
mate goal of deterrence policy. 
Significantly, negligence regimes often do not give defendants 
any direct incentive to constrain their levels of activity. Negligence 
regimes can easily condition liability on whether a driver was exer­
cising appropriate care, and this gives drivers an incentive to choose 
their care appropriately. But such regimes rarely condition liability 
on whether a defendant drove with unnecessary frequency (proba­
bly because of the difficulty of determining a "reasonable" fre­
quency), so they give drivers no incentive to limit their total amount 
of driving. In terms of the analysis used in this article, the 
probability of being held liable (for any given accident) usually is 
not responsive at all to any change in the number of miles the de­
fendant drove. 
If enforcement is perfect, strict liability regimes can improve de­
fendants' incentives to adjust their levels of activity. In theory, 
strict liability forces defendants to internalize all of the social costs 
caused by their activity, and thus gives them an incentive to think 
about every way of reducing those costs, including engaging in the 
activity less frequently.83 Even under a regime of strict liability, 
however, imperfect enforcement will dilute a defendant's incen­
tives. That is, if a driver (or a firm employing a fleet of drivers) 
should be liable for every accident that results, but if there is only a 
25% chance that any given accident will lead to a successful suit, 
the firm's liability will reflect only 25% of the costs its activity im­
poses, thus giving it too weak an incentive to reduce its amount of 
driving. In such a case, the traditional multiplier can restore the 
optimal incentives by multiplying the firm's expected liability by 
four, thus making the firm again bear the full social costs of its driv­
ing activity. 
It might seem, then, that whenever the level of the defendant's 
activity can affect social costs, the traditional multiplier would al­
ways be the better way of achieving optimal deterrence. However, 
this conclusion is subject to three important limitations. First, the 
traditional multiplier only produces this effect in regimes of "strict 
liability," as that term was defined earlier.84 In "negligence" re­
gimes, defendants will still escape responsibility for the social costs 
of their activities whenever they are found to have complied with 
the legal standard, so even a traditional multiplier will not optimize 
83. See id. 
84. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
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levels of activity. And since most legal regimes really are "negli­
gence" regimes (under the definition used here), this argument for 
the traditional multiplier is of limited applicability. 
Second, even under regimes of "strict liability," there are a few 
cases in which increases in the level of activity could increase the 
probability of punishment per violation. For example, if one of a 
company's trucks is detected leaking toxic chemicals, the authori­
ties may then decide to inspect all the other trucks owned by that 
firm. If so, the per-violation probability of punishment will indeed 
respond to changes in the overall quantity of driving, because 
increased driving brings a greater probability that at least one of the 
firm's trucks will be detected leaking chemicals, thus triggering an 
inspection of all the trucks. While this form of interdependence is 
probably not very common, it sometimes occurs in the investigation 
of criminal activities (tax fraud, racketeering, drug rings, etc.), 
where detection of one offense triggers close investigation of all of a 
defendant's activities. 
Third, even when the traditional multiplier is superior in its ef­
fect on levels of activity, it may give rise to other problems that 
outweigh this benefit. After all, the level of activity is only one of 
the dimensions of social cost with which the law should be con­
cerned. As the remaining subsections will discuss, there are other 
dimensions along which a case-by-case multiplier might sometimes 
be inferior to the alternative routes to optimal deterrence. 
D. Optimal Levels of Risk 
As noted earlier, the optimal case-by-case multiplier will typi­
cally be greater than (and will never be any less than) the optimal 
constant multiplier. This could make the case-by-case multiplier 
inferior from the standpoint of optimal levels of risk, quite indepen­
dently of any effect the multiplier might have on levels of deter­
rence. If either defendants or their victims are risk averse, there 
will be benefits from keeping the total amount of risk in the system 
at a minimum. In a world of imperfect enforcement, however, a 
case-by-case multiplier increases the risk in the system because it 
presents defendants with the risk of paying even larger penalties. 
This could be a drawback in either of two situations. 
First, as Polinsky and Shavell have noted, the effect on risk is a 
drawback if defendants are risk averse and full insurance is unavail-
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able.85 If defendants are risk averse, a 25% chance of having to pay 
$20 million in damages (as the traditional multiplier would recom­
mend) will press on them more than four times as heavily as a 25% 
chance of having to pay only $5 million. The larger award thus 
could produce too much of a deterrent effect; and the larger award 
could also reduce total welfare directly, by forcing defendants to 
bear the disutility of this increased risk. However, the significance 
of these drawbacks are limited by the fact that they apply only to 
defendants who are risk averse, and even then only if they cannot 
get liability insurance (which would transfer the risk to a risk neu­
tral insurance company). Most damage awards are legally insura­
ble.86 Even when they are not, many defendants are publicly held 
corporations who can usually be presumed to be risk neutral, or 
capable of self insurance through diversification of their sharehold­
ers' portfolios.87 
Even when insurance is readily available, however, the effect on 
risk may still be a drawback if victims are risk averse, at least when 
the defendant and its victims stand in a market relationship (such as 
seller-customer or employer-employee). To be sure, there is some­
times no need for any liability at all when the defendant and its 
victims stand in a market relationship, if the victims are well 
informed about the risks and so the defendant will have adequate 
market incentives to improve its behavior.88 In some markets, 
though, potential victims may not be quite so well-informed, in 
which case market incentives alone may be inadequate for optimal 
deterrence. This, at least, is the standard argument for any form of 
liability for deterrence purposes when defendants and their victims 
stand in a market relationship.89 And if the enforcement of such 
liability is imperfect, the same arguments that would call for a dam-
85. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 886-87. For more technical economic analy­
ses, see Louis A. Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That 
Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 3, 6-8 (1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 
AM. EcoN. REv. 880, 884-85 (1979); Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. 
EcoN. 120, 124-26 (1982). 
86. Even punitive damage awards are insurable in some states. See Polinsky & Shavell, 
supra note 3, at 931 n.193. 
87. See id. at 887 n.44. Obviously, this conclusion would not apply to the extent that the 
risk in question was systematic (e.g., the risk of a change in legal rules that would increase the 
expected liability of all corporations). 
88. See id. at 935-36. 
89. For formal economic models, see, e.g., Shavell, supra note 82, at 14-17; Michael 
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REv. EcoN. 
STUD. 561 (1977). 
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age multiplier in other contexts would appear to call for a multiplier 
in market relationships as well.90 
The important point about market relationships, though, is that 
defendants' expected liability will ultimately have to be borne by 
consumers in the form of higher prices.91 For example, if product 
defects cause $5 million in damages but defendants are held liable 
only 25% of the time, a premium will have to be added to the prod­
uct's price to cover the defendant's expected liability of $1.25 mil­
lion (.25 x $5,000,000) .  If the legal system then adopts the 
traditional case-by-case multiplier, thus making defendants pay $20 
million every time they are caught ( 4 x $5,000,000), their expected 
liability will rise to $5 million (.25 x 4 x $5,000,000), so the price 
premium will have to be four times as large. In other words, the 
good news is that those consumers who are lucky enough to bring a 
successful lawsuit will have their recovery increased by a factor of 
four, but the bad news is that all consumers will have to pay an up­
front price that includes a premium that is four times as large. In 
effect, the introduction of a multiplier turns the liability component 
of the price into a lottery ticket, with a bigger price up front sup­
porting the chance of a bigger payoff at the end. 
If customers are risk neutral, they will be indifferent toward this 
lottery; and if they are risk-preferring then they might actually like 
this sort of a gamble. It is more plausible, though, to assume that 
customers are risk averse, at least with respect to this sort of contin­
gency. Those who would like some additional gamble can always 
go to the race track or play the state lottery, and it would be odd to 
posit a taste for gambling that could only be satisfied by wagering 
on a particular product defect. For most customers, then, the intro­
duction of this extra lottery element will make the product less 
attractive, causing an additional welfare loss.92 
Moreover, this effect (unlike the effect on risk averse defend­
ants) will not disappear with the purchase of insurance. While full 
insurance can protect parties from many forms of risk, in this con­
text consumers could be protected only by purchasing "reverse" 
insurance of a sort that is rarely available. That is, consumers 
90. Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 935; see also id. at 938 (making the same argu­
ment for punitive damages in breach of contract cases). Breach of contract cases, by defini· 
tion, always involve defendants and victims who were in a market relationship. 
91. For a review of the literature on this point, see Richard Craswell, Passing On the 
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. 
REv. 361 (1991). 
92. I develop this point at more length in Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Mar­
ket Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1994). 
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would need a policy in which the insurance company paid the con­
sumer up front (rather than the consumer paying an insurance pre­
mium), in return for which the consumer would assign to the 
insurance company his or her right to the punitive portion of any 
damage award. In theory, the up-front payment by the insurance 
company would exactly compensate the consumer for that part of 
the higher product price that reflected the punitive portion of the 
defendant's expected liability. Such a policy would thus have the 
same effect as restoring consumers to the premultiplier regime, in 
which they paid a lower price and were limited to compensatory 
damages if they sued. But since this sort of reverse insurance is 
rarely available, most consumers will have no way to insulate them­
selves from the risk-increasing effect of the larger, case-by-case 
multiplier.93 
Of course, even when this risk-increasing effect is a drawback, 
that may not be sufficient reason to reject the traditional multiplier. 
If damage multipliers are used only rarely, the effect on total risk­
bearing costs is not likely to be very large.94 Moreover, the effect 
on risk averse parties is only one of the relevant consequences the 
law must consider, and a slight negative effect on risk averse con­
sumers might be outweighed by greater improvements in (say) the 
ease of administration, or the effects on defendants' levels of activ­
ity. My point here is simply that all of these effects must be consid­
ered before any overall decision is reached - and that in 
evaluating this totality of effects, the effect on risk averse consum­
ers will usually count as a negative. 
E. Practical Constraints on the Maximum Penalty 
The traditional, case-by-case multiplier may also be less desira­
ble if defendants have limited assets, and would be unable to pay a 
fine as high as that required by the multiplier principle. This con­
straint is particularly likely to be a problem when the probability of 
punishment is small, so the penalty required under a case-by-case 
multiplier would be large. For example, if a violation causes $5 mil-
93. One possible way of providing such insurance might be a market in which consumers 
could sell their right to recovery in advance, at the same time they purchased the product. 
For a discussion of how this market might work, see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in 
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383 (1989). As Cooter points out, though, these 
transactions are illegal under current law. See id. at 383 & n.1. 
94. For empirical evidence consistent with this view, at least where punitive damages are 
concerned, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determi­
nants, Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts to 
Limit Awards, 52 J.L. & EcoN. (forthcoming 1999). 
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lion worth of damages but brings only a 25% probability of punish­
ment, the optimal case-by-case multiplier would require a fine of 
$20 million ( 4 x $5,000,000). But if many defendants are thinly 
capitalized firms, the threat of an $20 million penalty may have no 
more effect than the threat of a $9 or $10 million penalty, if $9 or 
$10 million is the most they could possibly pay. Indeed, in some 
cases the adoption of larger penalties could even reduce deterrence, 
by giving potential defendants an incentive to operate with even 
less capital than they otherwise might. This would make it even 
more likely that these defendants would not have to pay the full 
legal penalty (because they would not have enough money to pay 
it), and so would further reduce the law's deterrent effect.95 
One possible solution to this problem is to (1) raise the penalty 
as high as possible, then (2) make up for any remaining underdeter­
rence by improving the enforcement system to raise the probability 
of punishment.96 In the above example, if the maximum fine that 
could possibly be collected is only $10 million, optimal incentives 
could still be achieved if the enforcement system were improved to 
raise the probability of punishment from 25% to 50%, since that 
would make the expected penalty equal the expected social harm 
(.50 x $10,000,000 = $5,000,000). However, improving the enforce­
ment system has costs of its own that must also be taken into ac­
count. As a result, this solution usually leads to a compromise in 
which the probability of punishment is raised to some extent (at 
some cost), but it is not raised high enough to satisfy the multiplier 
principle. 97 
What is less often noted, though, is that the alternative routes to 
optimal deterrence may provide another solution to this problem. 
As we have seen, alternatives such as a constant multiplier or a con­
stant fine typically require smaller penalties than those required by 
the case-by-case multiplier. As a result, the fines or damage awards 
required under these alternatives are less likely to run up against 
95. For an economic model of this effect, see James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, Do 
Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?, 19 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 47 {1999). For an analysis 
of the effect of limited capital on deterrence generally, see S. Shaven, The Judgment-Proof 
Problem, 6 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 45 {1986). 
96. Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, allude to this possibility at 922 n.167. 
97. For mathematical analyses of these trade-offs, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shaven, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 618 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, supra note 85, 69 AM. EcoN. REv. 
883 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprison­
ment, 24 J. PuB. EcoN. 89 (1984) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shaven, Fines and Imprisonment]. 
As the second of these articles indicates, another possible solution to the problem of defend­
ants with limited assets - albeit a solution with costs of its own - is to resort to nonmone­
tary sanctions such as imprisonment. See Polinsky & Shaven, Fines and Imprisonment, supra. 
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the constraints imposed by defendants' limited assets. Where lim­
ited assets are a problem, then, these alternatives may actually be 
superior to the traditional multiplier. 
Moreover, there are other factors besides limited assets that 
may constrain the maximum penalty. Jurors (even judges or prose­
cutors) are sometimes reluctant to impose penalties that seem "too 
large," thus constraining the maximum penalty through jury nullifi­
cation (or through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).98 
Whenever this is likely, the effect will be the same as if the maxi­
mum penalty were constrained for any other reason. In particular, 
if this constraint is below the size of the penalty required by the 
multiplier principle, the case-by-case multiplier will lead to un­
derdeterrence. Here, too, there may be an advantage to one of the 
alternatives that can achieve optimal deterrence with smaller 
penalties. 
F. Litigation Costs 
Because of their smaller size, the alternatives to the traditional 
multiplier may also reduce the amount spent on litigation in any 
particular case.99 This is so for two reasons: the total stakes will be 
lower, and not as much will tum on establishing any particular 
probability of punishment. 
First, a traditional multiplier raises the stakes involved in litigat­
ing other issues, such as the amount of damages to which the multi­
plier will be applied (or the underlying issue of liability itself). 
Under a system with no multiplier at all, defendants obviously will 
have some incentive to try to convince the court that their behavior 
did not do very much harm, or that they should not be found liable 
at all. But if case-by-case multipliers are used, every reduction in 
the measure of damages will be three times as valuable to the de­
fendant if the multiplier is three, or five times or ten times as valua­
ble (if the multiplier is five or ten). To be sure, the measure of 
damages and the question of underlying liability will also take on 
greater importance under any regime using a constant multiplier, as 
long as that multiplier is greater than one. But since the optimal 
constant multiplier will almost always be less than the optimal 
98. An economic model with some of these features - specifically, a model in which 
finders of fact implicitly raise the burden of proof when higher sanctions are sought - is 
presented in James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: 
Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. EcoN. 385 (1991). 
99. The effect on total litigation costs, by increasing or decreasing the number of suits that 
are filed, was discussed in supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
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case-by-case multiplier, the incentive to spend on litigation should 
at least be lower if a constant multiplier is used (and similarly for a 
constant fine, or for an adjustment to the substantive standard with 
no adjustment in liability). 
Second, a case-by-case multiplier also gives parties an incentive 
to spend money litigating the size of the multiplier itself. Consider, 
for example, a defendant who caused $5 million worth of damages, 
and for whom the probability of punishment was somewhere 
around 20%. H the court finds that the probability of punishment 
was exactly 20%, the case-by-case multiplier will be set at five and 
the defendant will have to pay $25 million in damages (5 x 
$5,000,000). But if the defendant persuades the court that the 
probability of punishment was really 25%,  the case-by-case multi­
plier will then be set at four, and the damage award will be reduced 
to $20 million ( 4 x $5,000,000). In other words, the defendant can 
save $5 million in liability ($25,000,000 - $20,000,000) just by alter­
ing the court's perception of the probability by five percentage 
points. This is the same as the amount the defendant could gain by 
establishing that it was not liable at all, thus reducing its liability 
from $5,000,000 to 0, in a regime that did not use any multipliers. 
For many litigants, then, it will pay to spend just as much litigating 
the probability of punishment (in a system with case-by-case multi­
pliers) as they would spend contesting liability itself (in a system 
with purely compensatory damages). 
Of course, if there is a chance they could alter the court's find­
ing on probability even more - say, by raising it from 20% to 33%, 
thus reducing the multiplier from five to three - they will have an 
incentive to spend even more. By contrast, this incentive will be 
eliminated in any system employing a constant multiplier or a con­
stant fine. For all of these reasons, then, the amount spent litigating 
each case should be significantly higher under the traditional 
case-by-case multiplier. 
G. Symbolic or Expressive Effects 
Finally, the alternatives to the case-by-case multiplier may also 
have symbolic or expressive advantages. Recall that, when the 
probability of punishment declines with improvements in a defend­
ant's behavior (as it usually will), the case-by-case multiplier has to 
be largest for those defendants who behaved relatively well (to 
make up for their low probability of punishment), and smallest for 
defendants who behaved relatively badly. For instance, in one of 
the examples discussed earlier, defendants who took extra precau-
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tions s·aw their probability of punishment fall from 25% to 10%, 
thus increasing the case-by-case multiplier from four to ten.100 The 
actual damages in that example were $6 million without the extra 
precautions and $5 million with the precautions. With a 
case-by-case multiplier, however, defendants who took the extra 
precautions had to pay $50 million every time they were caught (10 
x $5,000,000), while defendants who did not take the precautions 
had to pay only $24 million ( 4 x $6,000,000). 
A possible objection is that this inverts the "fair" or "just" rela­
tion between wrongfulness of behavior and severity of punishment, 
by punishing those who behave well more harshly than those who 
behave badly. The objection is not that this will distort such parties' 
incentives, because incentives depend on the expected levels of pun­
ishment, and the expected punishment is more severe for defend­
ants who do not take precautions (.25 x 4 x $6,000,000 = $6,000,000) 
than for defendants who do (.10 x 10 x $5,000,000 = $5,000,000). 
But it is sometimes argued that justice places independent con­
straints on the penalties that can be meted out by the state -
independent, that is, of any utilitarian or deterrence-related goals 
- and that the regime described here would run afoul of those con­
straints.101 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested (though with­
out addressing this precise issue) that some proportionality between 
the size of the penalty and the wrongfulness of the defendant's con­
duct may even be constitutionally required.102 
Moreover, even those who object to deontological constraints 
on the size of the permissible penalties might still worry that bad 
consequences would follow from a regime that punished mild 
offenses more severely than egregious ones. It is sometimes said 
that one function of law is to educate its citizens and to instill ap­
propriate attitudes concerning right and wrong.103 Presumably, this 
expressive or educative function includes expressing appropriate at-
100. See supra text following note 14. 
101. Cf. !MMANuEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd 
trans., Bobbs-Merril Co. 1965) (1916) ("The law concerning punishment is a categorical im­
perative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happi­
ness [i.e., utility] looking for some advantage to be gained . . . .  "). For modem discussions of 
this position, describing in more detail its conflict with the multiplier principle, see Chapman 
& Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 779-98; Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. 
& Pus. A.FF. 42 (1979). 
102. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-76, 580-81 (1996). 
103. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 
472-73 (1997). For further development of this idea in connection with punitive damages, see 
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 
AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1430-40 (1993). 
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titudes about relative degrees of wrongfulness. But the regime de­
scribed above could send the wrong signal in this regard, as it could 
suggest that defendants who took the extra precautions (and there­
fore had to pay $50 million) had behaved worse than the defend­
ants who did not take the extra precautions (and who only had to 
pay $24 million).104 If citizens' attitudes are shaped by this incor­
rect signal, that could affect the citizens' willingness to reduce their 
own pollution (or even their willingness to comply with laws in gen­
eral), thus raising the cost of achieving any given level of 
deterrence. 
To be sure, each of these arguments has difficulties of its own. It 
is controversial (to say the least) whether we ought to accept purely 
deontological constraints on the size of permissible punishments. 
Moreover, the argument that inverted penalties will send the wrong 
moral message depends on a kind of misperception on the part of 
the audience of the signal. That is, if citizens realized that the re­
gime described above was adopted solely for its deterrent virtues, 
and that the difference in penalties therefore expressed only the 
fact that the probability of punishment was different for the two 
defendants, there would then be no reason for citizens to draw an 
incorrect moral lesson. Indeed, if citizens realized that the expected 
penalty was actually harsher for defendants who did not take extra 
precautions, they might continue to draw the correct moral lesson, 
in which case the law's expressive or educative effect would be rein­
forced. The concern that citizens will draw the wrong moral lesson 
thus rests on an implicit assumption of "noise" or miscommunica­
tion between the message intended by the drafters of the policy and 
the message understood by the citizenry. And while such errors or 
misperceptions are no doubt common, it is notoriously difficult to 
predict the exact form they will take. 
Still, the fact that such misperceptions are possible means that 
this concern cannot be dismissed out of hand. My only point here is 
that, to the extent this danger is real, it too can be avoided by using 
one of the alternatives to the traditional multiplier principle. Since 
these alternatives all allow the actual penalties (not just the ex­
pected penalties) to increase in severity with the egregiousness of 
the defendant's behavior, they would not pose any risk of the moral 
misperception at issue here. 
104. This very objection is made by Galanter & Luban, supra note 103, at 1449-50. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, the traditional multiplier of one over the 
probability of punishment can achieve optimal deterrence if it is 
recalculated on a case-by-case basis, to reflect the probability of 
punishment facing each individual defendant. Moreover, if it is ap­
plied in this way, the traditional multiplier will be optimal in a wide 
variety of circumstances, regardless of whether the premultiplier 
incentives favored under- or overdeterrence. Because a case-by­
case multiplier can achieve optimal deterrence using a relatively 
simple formula under so broad a range of conditions, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the law review literature has focused almost ex­
clusively on this method of correcting for imperfect enforcement. 
In fact, though, the law uses a variety of other methods that do 
not fit the traditional multiplier principle. Sometimes the law uses a 
constant multiplier; sometimes it uses constant fines; and sometimes 
it uses adjustments to the substantive legal standard. Indeed, while 
all of these methods are relatively common, it is very difficult to 
find examples of a true case-by-case multiplier, in which defendants 
whose conduct faces a high probability of punishment are "re­
warded" with a multiplier lower than that given to defendants 
whose conduct is less likely to be punished. Unfortunately, the 
legal literature has focused so much on the case-by-case multiplier 
principle that it has not even begun to address the pros and cons of 
these alternative (and much more common) systems of deterrence. 
This article is an attempt to begin to fill that gap. While its conclu­
sions are necessarily tentative, several points can be made. 
First, the traditional analysis is still perfectly valid whenever the 
probability of punishment is essentially unresponsive to changes in 
a defendant's behavior. This is most likely to be the case when the 
probability of punishment depends entirely on whether the defend­
ant's offense is detected. In other words, the traditional analysis is 
strongest if, once the offense is detected, prosecution and convic­
tion (or litigation and civil liability) are virtually sure to follow. If, 
in addition, the probability of detection depends purely on chance, 
rather than on a prosecutorial decision to allocate more resources 
to detecting serious offenses; and if any rules excluding certain 
losses from the fine or damage award are applied no more harshly 
against defendants who behaved badly than against defendants who 
behaved well, the expected punishment will then be completely in­
dependent of any improvements in a defendant's behavior. In such 
a case, there will be no difference between the optimal case-by-case 
multiplier and the optimal constant multiplier (or the optimal con-
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stant fine), and all of them will have to satisfy the traditional multi­
plier principle. 
In all other cases, however, the probability of punishment will 
respond to improvements in defendants' behavior. In these cases, 
as we have seen, satisfaction of the multiplier principle will no 
longer be necessary for optimal deterrence (though it may still be 
sufficient). For example, the optimal constant multiplier will gener­
ally be less than the level called for by the multiplier principle, per­
haps even at or below compensatory levels. The optimal fine, too, 
could also be less than the traditional multiplier principle, though in 
some cases it could be greater. Moreover, if adjustments to the sub­
stantive legal standard are also employed, the optimal fine or dam­
age award could be even less. On the other hand, if the substantive 
standard is relaxed considerably, to the point where a defendant 
who behaves optimally faces no risk whatsoever of being found in 
violation of the standard, the penalties for those found in violation 
could then be substantially raised without interfering with optimal 
deterrence. 
In any of these cases, the law faces a choice about which strat­
egy to use to achieve optimal deterrence. This is the choice whose 
investigation I have tried to begin. Preliminarily, I can suggest that 
the case-by-case multiplier will work best whenever it is extremely 
important to optimize defendants' levels of activity as well as their 
levels of care, and/or if it is more efficient to have all the calcula­
tions needed for deterrence made anew by a judge or jury in each 
individual case. On the other hand, one of the other strategies will 
probably be best if it is more efficient to have these calculations 
made by a central legislative or administrative body, and/or if there 
are practical constraints on the maximum penalty the law can 
assess, thus requiring penalties below the traditional multiplier. 
One of the alternative strategies may also be best if it is important 
to preserve a direct relationship between the harmfulness of a de­
fendant's conduct and the size of the actual penalty that is imposed, 
either because such proportionality is constitutionally required, or 
because it is desirable in order to send the proper symbolic 
message. 
I have stressed that these conclusions are tentative, and doubt­
less they could be improved or refined through further analysis. 
Until we recognize that there is a choice to be made, however, no 
progress on these issues will even be possible. It is time to recog­
nize that the multiplier principle is sufficient but not necessary for 
optimal deterrence. 
